Country Actions: February 2021 Update
NTI Index Country Action Tracker
Updated February 22, 2021
Countries Are Taking Action to Strengthen the Global Architecture and Eliminate Nuclear Materials
This webpage lists actions countries have taken since March 31, 2020, when data gathering for the 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index (NTI Index) closed.
Since March 31, 2020, countries have taken steps to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture, increase transparency, and reduce quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Countries have taken the following actions (newly updated actions in bold):
- Reduced quantities weapons-usable nuclear materials
- Ratified key nuclear security treaties
- Participated in International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) activities
- Updated declarations of civilian nuclear material stocks
- Subscribed to nuclear security Information Circulars (INFCIRCs)
- Submitted information about laws and regulations to the IAEA under Article 14 of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
These actions demonstrate that countries continue to make progress to strengthen their own nuclear security, enhance transparency, and support the global nuclear security architecture.
How to Use the Tracker
The table includes actions related to a subset of the subindicators in the NTI Index that can be obtained without the need for in-depth country research.
The table identifies the relevant subindicator number and name, the country (with link to Index country page), the action taken and date of action, and the source (with link, where available).
The tracking spreadsheet that allows the user to sort and filter information is available for download here. Users can submit actions for inclusion in the next update to Samantha Neakrase at [email protected].
Updates as of February 22, 2021
| Index Subindicator | Country | Action/Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 Quantities of materials | No update | ||
| 1.3.1 Material production/ elimination trends | Canada | Worked with the United States to repatriate 161kg of HEU from Chalk River Laboratories to the United States (announced January 25, 2021) | Canadian Nuclear Laboratories |
| Kazakhstan | Removed remaining 2.9kg of HEU from the IGR research reactor in Kurchatov for downblending into LEU; committed to convert HEU-fueled research reactor at Kazakhstan’s National Nuclear Center in 2021 (announced September 22, 2020) | U.S. Department of Energy | |
| 3.1.1 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) | Angola | Ratified September 21, 2020 | IAEA |
| Eritrea | Ratified March 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| 3.1.2 CPPNM Amendment | Angola | Ratified September 21, 2020 | IAEA |
| Eritrea | Ratified March 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| 3.1.3 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) | St. Kitts and Nevis* | Ratified August 13, 2020 | UN |
| 3.2.1 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) | No update | ||
| 3.2.2 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction | No update | ||
| 3.2.4 IAEA Nuclear Security Fund Contributions | No update | ||
| 3.2.6 Centers of Excellence | No update | ||
| 3.2.8 IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) | Rwanda | Joined the ITDB on October 4, 2020 | IAEA |
| 3.2.9 Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) | No update | ||
| 3.3.4 Public declarations/ reports about civilian nuclear materials | Belgium | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on May 18, 2020 | IAEA |
| France | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on August 28, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Germany | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on August 28, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Japan | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on September 4, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Russia | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on November 24, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Switzerland | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on August 20, 2020 | IAEA | |
| United Kingdom | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on November 24, 2020 | IAEA | |
| 3.3.6 Peer review (INSServ, ISSAS) | No update | ||
| 3.3.7 International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission | No update | ||
| 3.4.1 Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869 | No update | ||
| 3.4.2 Other nuclear security INFCIRCs (899, 901, 904, 905, 908, 909, 912, 917, and 918) | Slovenia | Subscribed to INFCIRC/908 on October 7, 2020 | IAEA |
| 4.2.2 National Framework for CPPNM Amendment (Article 14) | Algeria | Submitted Article 14 information, October 16, 2020 | IAEA |
| Armenia | Submitted Article 14 information September 8, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Austria | Submitted Article 14 information, January 5, 2021+ | IAEA | |
| Guatemala | Submitted Article 14 information, August 24, 2020++ | IAEA | |
| Jordan | Submitted Article 14 information, October 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Luxembourg | Submitted Article 14 information, August 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Madagascar | Submitted Article 14 information, August 12, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Russia | Submitted Article 14 information, September 1, 2020+ | IAEA | |
| Saudi Arabia | Submitted Article 14 information, July 25, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Sweden | Submitted Article 14 information, May 11, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Syria | Submitted Article 14 information, August 26, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Togo | Submitted Article 14 information, December 8, 2020++ | IAEA | |
| Uruguay | Submitted Article 14 information, July 15, 2020 | IAEA |
+Updated Article 14 submission. Country already receives credit in the NTI Index for having previously submitted Article 14 information.
++Action taken under the original CPPNM will not receive credit in the NTI Index. The NTI Index gives credit only for actions taken under the Amended CPPNM.
Photo credit: Argonne National Laboratories/Flickr
