Country Actions: October 2022 Update
NTI Index Country Action Tracker
Updated October 5, 2022
Countries Are Taking Action to Reduce Stockpiles of Weapons-Useable Nuclear Materials and Strengthen the Global Architecture
This webpage lists actions countries have taken since March 31, 2020, when data gathering for the 2020 NTI Nuclear Security Index (NTI Index) closed.
Since March 31, 2020, countries have taken steps to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture, increase transparency, and reduce quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials. Countries have taken the following actions (newly updated actions in bold):
- Reduced quantities of weapons-useable nuclear materials
- Conducted peer reviews of nuclear security arrangements
- Ratified key nuclear security treaties
- Submitted information about laws and regulations to the IAEA under Article 14 of the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
These actions demonstrate that countries continue to make progress to strengthen their own nuclear security, enhance transparency, and support the global nuclear security architecture.
In addition, on October 21, 2020, Switzerland’s Federal Office of Public Health took regulatory action to phase out Cesium-137 blood irradiators by 2025, introduced a five-year action plan to prevent radioactive sources from being used for malicious purposes. This action will be reflected in the next edition of the Radioactive Source Security Assessment.
How to Use the Tracker
The table includes actions related to a subset of the subindicators in the NTI Index that can be obtained without the need for in-depth country research.
The table identifies the relevant subindicator number and name, the country (with link to Index country page), the action taken and date of action, and the source (with link, where available).
The tracking spreadsheet that allows the user to sort and filter information is available for download here. Users can submit actions for inclusion in the next update to Jack Brosnan at [email protected].
Updates as of October 5, 2022
| Index Subindicator | Country | Action/Date | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1.1.1 Quantities of materials | No update | ||
| 1.3.1 Material production/ elimination trends | Austria | Worked with the United States to remove a small quantity of plutonium from the IAEA’s Office of Safeguards Analytical Services (SGAS) Nuclear Material Laboratory (announced April 1, 2022) | Public Announcement |
| Canada | Worked with the United States to repatriate 161kg of HEU from Chalk River Laboratories to the United States (announced January 25, 2021) | Canadian Nuclear Laboratories | |
| Iran | Iran has accumulated 43 kilograms (95 pounds) of uranium enriched to 60% (announced May 30, 2022) | Public Announcement | |
| Japan | Worked with the United States to repatriate 45kg of HEU from the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (announced August 9, 2022) | U.S. Department of Energy | |
| Kazakhstan | Removed remaining 2.9kg of HEU from the IGR research reactor in Kurchatov for downblending into LEU; committed to convert HEU-fueled research reactor at Kazakhstan’s National Nuclear Center in 2021 (announced September 22, 2020) | U.S. Department of Energy | |
| Netherlands | Ended the use of HEU targets for the production of Mo-99 at the High Flux Reactor (HFR) | Public Announcement | |
| United States | Certified that there is sufficient supply fo Mo-99 produced with LEU and therefore, no more HEU will be exported for this purpose | U.S. Department of Energy | |
| 3.1.1 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) | Angola | Ratified September 21, 2020 | IAEA |
| Congo | Acceded September 3, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Eritrea | Ratified March 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Zimbabwe | Acceded September 20, 2021 | IAEA | |
| 3.1.2 CPPNM Amendment | Angola | Ratified September 21, 2020 | IAEA |
| Brazil | Ratified March 18, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Eritrea | Ratified March 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Malawi | Ratified February 11, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Oman | Ratified June 28, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Philippines | Ratified June 16, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Rwanda | Ratified September 23, 2021 | IAEA | |
| 3.1.3 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) | Botswana | Ratified July 12, 2021 | UN |
| St. Kitts and Nevis* | Ratified August 13, 2020 | UN | |
| 3.2.1 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) | No update | ||
| 3.2.2 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction | No update | ||
| 3.2.4 IAEA Nuclear Security Fund Contributions | No update | ||
| 3.2.6 Centers of Excellence | No update | ||
| 3.2.8 IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) | Rwanda | Joined the ITDB on October 4, 2020 | IAEA |
| Antigua and Barbuda* | Joined ITDB on March 24, 2021 | IAEA | |
| 3.2.9 Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC) | No update | ||
| 3.3.4 Public declarations/ reports about civilian nuclear materials | Belgium | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on May 18, 2020 | IAEA |
| Belgium | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on May 12, 2021 | IAEA | |
| France | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on August 28, 2020 | IAEA | |
| France | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on September 2, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Germany | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on August 28, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Germany | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on September 10, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Japan | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on September 4, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Japan | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on July 27, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Russia | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on November 17, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Russia | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on November 24, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Switzerland | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on August 20, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Switzerland | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on February 26, 2021 | IAEA | |
| United Kingdom | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on November 24, 2020 | IAEA | |
| United Kingdom | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on September 27, 2021 | IAEA | |
| United States | Submitted INFCIRC/549 declaration on October 12, 2021 | IAEA | |
| 3.3.6 Review of Security Arrangements | Jordan | The IAEA conducted an INSServ from 20 to 30 June 2022, was the first such IAEA mission in Jordan. | IAEA |
| Ukraine | The IAEA concluded a mission to the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine and the surrounding Exclusion Zone after carrying out planned nuclear safety, security and safeguards activities there. June 1, 2022 | Public Announcement | |
| 3.3.7 International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission | Finland | The International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission, conducted from 6 to 17 June, was the third such mission in Finland. | IAEA |
| 3.4.1 Information Circular (INFCIRC) 869 | No update | ||
| 3.4.2 Other nuclear security INFCIRCs (899, 901, 904, 905, 908, 909, 912, 917, and 918) | Slovenia | Subscribed to INFCIRC/908 on October 7, 2020 | IAEA |
| 4.2.2 National Framework for CPPNM Amendment (Article 14) | Algeria | Submitted Article 14 information, October 16, 2020 | IAEA |
| Armenia | Submitted Article 14 information September 8, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Austria | Submitted Article 14 information, January 5, 2021+ | IAEA | |
| Belgium | Submitted Article 14 information March 15, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Canada | Submitted Article 14 information, August 10, 2021+ | IAEA | |
| China | Submitted Article 14 information March 25, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Colombia | Submitted Article 14 information September 8, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Gabon | Submitted Article 14 information March 7, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Georgia | Submitted Article 14 information, November 4, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Guatemala | Submitted Article 14 information, August 24, 2020++ | IAEA | |
| Jordan | Submitted Article 14 information, October 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Kyrgyz Republic | Submitted Article 14 information January 14, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Luxembourg | Submitted Article 14 information, August 13, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Madagascar | Submitted Article 14 information, August 12, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Mali | Submitted Article 14 information May 10, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Niger | Submitted Article 14 information January 3, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Pakistan | Submitted Article 14 information, December 23, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Poland | Submitted Article 14 information March 21, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Russia | Submitted Article 14 information, September 21, 2020+ | IAEA | |
| Saudi Arabia | Submitted Article 14 information, April 6, 2022 | IAEA | |
| South Korea | Submitted Article 14 information, June 7, 2021 | IAEA | |
| Sweden | Submitted Article 14 information, May 11, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Syria | Submitted Article 14 information, August 26, 2020 | IAEA | |
| Togo | Submitted Article 14 information, December 8, 2020++ | IAEA | |
| Turkey | Submitted Article 14 information April 25, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Ukraine | Submitted Article 14 information April 1, 2022 | IAEA | |
| United Kingdom | Submitted Article 14 information March 25, 2022 | IAEA | |
| Uruguay | Submitted Article 14 information, July 15, 2020 | IAEA | |
| 4.3.1 Independent Regulatory Agency | Brazil | Established independent regulatory authority, the Nuclear Safety National Authority (ANSN) in May 2021 | Public Announcement |
+Updated Article 14 submission. Country already receives credit in the NTI Index for having previously submitted Article 14 information.
++Action taken under the original CPPNM will not receive credit in the NTI Index. The NTI Index gives credit only for actions taken under the Amended CPPNM.
Photo credit: IAEA/Flickr
