2026 Recommendations and Scores for

Iceland

Select tab

76/100 -3 Score Change from 2023

Rank 30/154 Tie

Actions to take

Show Progress-to-Date

Capitalize on the upcoming revision of Information Circular 225

Contribute to the revision process of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 through participation in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, and provide specific input on how to strengthen provisions regarding insider threat mitigation, cybersecurity systems, continuous threat assessment, and emerging technologies

Consolidate recent progress into a new era of enduring leadership

Commit to a coordinated effort to provide long-term financial and technical support for developing strong nuclear security regimes to countries embarking on new nuclear applications, leveraging specific national expertise to provide relevant support where needed
Provide consistent financial contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund

Deepen engagement with the international nuclear security community

Ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)
Send a ministerial-level delegations to the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS)
Join the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FTPRNT)

Endorse legal protections for nuclear infrastructure

Ratify the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, a 1977 amendment that, among other commitments, prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities (done)
Reinforce international norms against targeting nuclear facilities during war by endorsing and adhering to the IAEA’s Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict (done)

Subscribe to IAEA Information Circulars on Nuclear Security

Subscribe to INFCIRC/869
Subscribe to INFCIRC/908

Use the 2027 Review Conference for the Amended CPPNM to advance ratification and strengthen implementation

Sign and ratify the CPPNM (done)
Ratify, accept, or approve the Amended CPPNM (done)
Create a CPPNM implementation authority (done)

How Iceland scored

GLOBAL NORMS

The Global Norms category includes actions that contribute to the establishment of global norms for nuclear materials security. It includes important international legal commitments, voluntary participation in a number of global initiatives, and nuclear security INFCIRCs.

50/100 -5 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 68/154 Tie

International Legal Commitments

International legal commitments are the basis for domestic legislation, regulations, and security capacity.

See Subindicators

88/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 76/154 Tie

Physical Protection Convention (CPPNM)

Parties to the CPPNM commit to provide certain levels of physical protection during international transport of nuclear materials; cooperate in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material; and criminalize offenses involving nuclear material.

Assessment Question:

Is the state a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) (2)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Non-compliant or not a party
1	Signed
2	Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the state a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)? 0 = Non-compliant or not a party 1 = Signed 2 = Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/154 (tie)

2005 Amendment to the CPPNM

Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM commit to expand the scope of their responsibilities under the CPPNM to include protection of nuclear material in domestic use, in storage, and during transport, as well as protection of nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

Is the state a party to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Ratified, accepted or approved (or action having the same legal effect) (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Not ratified, accepted or approved
1	Ratified, accepted or approved (or action having the same legal effect)

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the state a party to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)? 0 = Not ratified, accepted or approved 1 = Ratified, accepted or approved (or action having the same legal effect)

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Nuclear Terrorism Convention (ICSANT)

Parties to the ICSANT commit to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and promote cooperation with other states to prevent, investigate, and punish those acts.

Assessment Question:

Is the state a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)?

Answer:

Signed (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Non-compliant or not a party
1	Signed
2	Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the state a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)? 0 = Non-compliant or not a party 1 = Signed 2 = Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Source:

United Nations

Rank 100/154 (tie)

IAEA safeguards agreement

Conclusion of a safeguards agreement demonstrates a state's commitment to its stewardship of nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

Has the state concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement?

Answer:

Yes, the Additional Protocol (2)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No or a Small Quantities Protocol or otherwise incomplete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities
1	Yes, a Modified Small Quantities Protocol, an INFCIRC 153, or complete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities under an equivalent arrangement
2	Yes, the Additional Protocol

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement? 0 = No or a Small Quantities Protocol or otherwise incomplete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities 1 = Yes, a Modified Small Quantities Protocol, an INFCIRC 153, or complete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities under an equivalent arrangement 2 = Yes, the Additional Protocol Countries with nuclear weapons only receive full credit if they have a voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA that explicitly make all civilian nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards.

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Additional Protocol of Geneva Convention

Inclusion of adherence to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (INFCIRC/335) as a measure in a Nuclear Security Index strengthens the assessment of a state’s commitment to preventing the use of nuclear facilities as instruments of warfare. Article 56 explicitly prohibits attacks on nuclear power plants and other installations containing dangerous forces, thereby reinforcing international norms that protect civilians and the environment from catastrophic harm during armed conflict. Tracking states’ ratification, accession, or withdrawal provides a clear, verifiable indicator of legal and ethical alignment with global standards for the protection of nuclear infrastructure and humanitarian principles.

Assessment Question:

Has the country ratified the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I)?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country ratified the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I)? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Committee of the Red Cross

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Voluntary Commitments

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for nuclear materials security.

See Subindicators

50/100 -17 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-6 where 6=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 57/154 Tie

Global FTPRNT [formerly GICNT membership]

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is the country/area a member of the Global FTPRNT?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country/area a member of the Global FTPRNT? 0 = No 1 = Yes This sub-indicator captured GICNT membership until 2023. It has been updated in 2026 as Global FTPRNT has since replaced GICNT membership.

Source:

Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism

Rank 50/154 (tie)

Global Partnership membership

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is the country/area a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country/area a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

U.S. Department of State

Rank 18/154 (tie)

WINS contributions

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) within the previous three years?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) within the previous three years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

World Institute for Nuclear Security Annual Report 2013 and 2014

Rank 3/154 (tie)

IAEA Nuclear Security Fund contributions

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund within the previous two years?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund within the previous two years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 10/154 (tie)

Bilateral/multilateral financial and in-kind assistance

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country/area provided financial and/or in-kind bilateral or multilateral assistance for other states or received such assistance in the field of nuclear security (exclusive of contributions captured elsewhere in this indicator) within the previous two years?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 8/154 (tie)

Ministerial participation in ICONS

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Did the country participate in the latest International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) at the ministerial level?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Did the country participate in the latest International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) at the ministerial level? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 36/154 (tie)

Incident and Trafficking Database

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Does the country participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) mission

EPREV missions help countries keep up to date protocols for nuclear security emergency preparedness and response.

Assessment Question:

Has the country hosted an Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) mission?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes, but not in the last 2 years.
2	Yes, in the last two years

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country hosted an Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) mission? 0 = No 1 = Yes, but not in the last 2 years. 2 = Yes, in the last two years

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 39/154 (tie)

ConvEx-3 and other field exercise participation

Participation in ConvEx-3 exercises and other field exercises boost countries' preparedness to address emergency scenarios as it relates to nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country participated in the most recent ConvEx-3 exercise or another relevant nuclear security field exercise in the last 5 years?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country participated in the most recent ConvEx-3 exercise or another relevant nuclear security field exercise in the last 5 years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Nuclear Security Guidance Committee

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Does the country/area participate in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country/area participate in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 53/154 (tie)

Endorsement of IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars

An endorsement of the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars signals a country's commitment to nuclear safety and security standards.

Assessment Question:

Has the country published any endorsement of the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country published any endorsement of the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Nuclear Security INFCIRCs

Countries/areas that have subscribed to nuclear security IAEA Information Circulars (INFCIRCs) demonstrate a commitment to international best practices in nuclear security.

See Subindicators

0/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 40/154 Tie

INFCIRC/869

Subscribing states commit to strengthening their national nuclear security regimes and ensuring continuous improvement.

Assessment Question:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/869?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/869? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 24/154 (tie)

INFCIRC/908

Subscribing states commit to establishing and implementing national-level measures to mitigate insider threat.

Assessment Question:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/908?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/908? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 25/154 (tie)

Other nuclear security INFCIRCs

Subscribing states commit to strengthening their national nuclear security regimes and supporting global norms.

Assessment Question:

Has the state subscribed to the following INFCIRCs: 899, 901, 904, 905, 909, 912, 917 and 918?

Answer:

No, the state has not subscribed to any of these INFCIRCs (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No, the state has not subscribed to any of these INFCIRCs
1	Yes, the state has subscribed to one of these INFCIRCs
2	Yes, the state has subscribed to two of these INFCIRCs
3	Yes, the state has subscribed to three or more of these INFCIRCs

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state subscribed to the following INFCIRCs: 899, 901, 904, 905, 909, 912, 917 and 918? 0 = No, the state has not subscribed to any of these INFCIRCs 1 = Yes, the state has subscribed to one of these INFCIRCs 2 = Yes, the state has subscribed to two of these INFCIRCs 3 = Yes, the state has subscribed to three or more of these INFCIRCs

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 35/154 (tie)

DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

The Domestic Commitments and Capacity category includes actions that indicate how well a country/area has implemented its international commitments and a country/area’s capacity to do so. This category includes the extent of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 implementation and whether the country/area has a national body to implement the CPPNM.

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 1/154 Tie

UNSCR 1540 Implementation

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 obliges action on nuclear materials security and its implementation demonstrates a state's commitment level.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/154 Tie

UNSCR 1540 reporting

Compliance with UNSCR 1540 reporting requirements demonstrates commitment to UNSCR 1540's security objectives.

Assessment Question:

Has the state provided the required UNSCR 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Answer:

The state has produced a 1540 report (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	The state has not produced a 1540 report
1	The state has produced a 1540 report

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state provided the required UNSCR 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)? 0 = The state has not produced a 1540 report 1 = The state has produced a 1540 report

Source:

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation

Implementation of UNSCR 1540 demonstrates commitment to UNSCR 1540's security objectives and improves security procedures and culture.

Assessment Question:

Extent of implementation is identified through the measures taken by a state and reflected in its UNSCR 1540 matrix.

Answer:

Very good (100+ points) (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very weak (0-24 points)
1	Weak (25-49 points) or matrix exists, but is not publicly available
2	Moderate (50-74 points)
3	Good (75-99 points)
4	Very good (100+ points)

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Extent of implementation is identified through the measures taken by a state and reflected in its UNSCR 1540 matrix. 0 = Very weak (0-24 points) 1 = Weak (25-49 points) or matrix exists, but is not publicly available 2 = Moderate (50-74 points) 3 = Good (75-99 points) 4 = Very good (100+ points)

Source:

Creation of a coding and scoring scheme by the Economist Enterprise, based on documents from the UN 1540 Committee

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Domestic Nuclear Security Legislation

The implementation of security measures is rooted in domestic nuclear security legislation.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/154 Tie

CPPNM implementation authority

Existence of a national authority (state body) to implement the CPPNM increases the likelihood of implementation and demonstrates commitment to the CPPNM's objectives.

Assessment Question:

Is there a national authority for the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	No
1	Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is there a national authority for the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/154 (tie)

RISK ENVIRONMENT

The Risk Environment can affect the nuclear security conditions in a country/area. Factors include political stability, effective governance, pervasiveness of corruption, illicit activities of non-state actors, and environmental risk.

80/100 -3 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 7/154

Political Stability

A lack of political stability may enable lapses in nuclear security.

See Subindicators

91/100 -4 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-21 where 21=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 5/154 Tie

Stability

Significant instability can affect the government's ability to secure nuclear facilities or the upheaval created by instability may provide opportunities for groups seeking to illicitly acquire nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

How stable is the country?

Answer:

Very high stability (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very low stability
1	Low stability
2	Moderate stability
3	High stability
4	Very high stability

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How stable is the country? 0 = Very low stability 1 = Low stability 2 = Moderate stability 3 = High stability 4 = Very high stability

Source:

Fragile States Index

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Orderly transfers of power

Instability and conflict surrounding changes of power may provide opportunities for groups seeking to commit acts of sabotage against nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Answer:

Very clear, established, and accepted (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Not clear, established or accepted
1	Two of the three criteria are absent
2	One of the three criteria is absent
3	Clear, established, and accepted
4	Very clear, established, and accepted

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another? 0 = Not clear, established or accepted 1 = Two of the three criteria are absent 2 = One of the three criteria is absent 3 = Clear, established, and accepted 4 = Very clear, established, and accepted Unclear, poorly established, or weakly accepted constitutional mechanisms for the transfer of power are a particular concern for succession in autocracies, but can also prove an issue in more democratic systems, for example, if election results are not accepted by all sides.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 1/154 (tie)

International disputes/tensions

Tensions with important trade or strategic partners and armed regional conflicts could have destabilizing implications for a country and, hence, for nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is the country currently involved, directly or indirectly, in an armed conflict or dispute?

Answer:

no conflict or involvement (5)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	war
1	limited wars
2	violent crises
3	non-violent crises
4	disputes
5	no conflict or involvement

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country currently involved, directly or indirectly, in an armed conflict or dispute? 0 = war 1 = limited wars 2 = violent crises 3 = non-violent crises 4 = disputes 5 = no conflict or involvement

Source:

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Armed conflict

Armed conflict in areas where nuclear facilities are located could could disrupt nuclear security implementation or result in direct damage to the physical infrastructure of nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

Is this country/area presently subject to armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict during the next two years?

Answer:

Incursive conflict; government remains in control, but opposition engages in frequent armed incursions (2)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Territorial conflict; opposition has effective control over a region or regions
1	Sporadic and incursive conflict
2	Incursive conflict; government remains in control, but opposition engages in frequent armed incursions
3	Sporadic conflict; government control is firm, but opposition engages in isolated incidents of violence
4	No armed conflict exists

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is this country/area presently subject to armed conflict, or is there at least a moderate risk of such conflict during the next two years? 0 = Territorial conflict; opposition has effective control over a region or regions 1 = Sporadic and incursive conflict 2 = Incursive conflict; government remains in control, but opposition engages in frequent armed incursions 3 = Sporadic conflict; government control is firm, but opposition engages in isolated incidents of violence 4 = No armed conflict exists This sub-indicator covers armed conflict either within the territory of the state or directly threatening it. Forms of conflict may range from sporadic or incursive conflict with non-state actors to conventional conflict with secessionist entities or other states.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 113/154 (tie)

Violent demonstrations or violent civil/labor unrest

Violent demonstrations that require police and security attention in areas where nuclear facilities are located could seriously compromise site security and the availability of resources.

Assessment Question:

Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labor unrest likely to occur during the next two years?

Answer:

Very low (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labor unrest likely to occur during the next two years? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low Violent demonstrations or civil/labor unrest may arise from socioeconomic factors such as unemployment or fiscal austerity; ethnic, religious or political divisions; labor disputes; and refugee or migrant flows.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Effective Governance

A lack of effective governance can compromise a country/area’s ability to establish and sustain policies to secure nuclear facilities.

See Subindicators

88/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 7/154 Tie

Effectiveness of the political system

An ineffective political system can compromise a country/area’s ability to establish and sustain policies to secure nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

How effective is the country’s political system in formulating and executing policy?

Answer:

Very high (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very low
1	Low
2	Moderate
3	High
4	Very high

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How effective is the country’s political system in formulating and executing policy? 0 = Very low 1 = Low 2 = Moderate 3 = High 4 = Very high This sub-indicator assesses tensions between the legislative and executive branches of government; instability in government formation; and cohesion of the legislature.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Quality of the bureaucracy

An ineffective bureaucracy can compromise a country/area’s ability to establish and sustain policies to secure nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

What is the quality of the country’s bureaucracy and its ability to carry out government policy?

Answer:

High (3)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very low
1	Low
2	Moderate
3	High
4	Very high

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

What is the quality of the country’s bureaucracy and its ability to carry out government policy? 0 = Very low 1 = Low 2 = Moderate 3 = High 4 = Very high This sub-indicator assesses the quality of the bureaucracy across the following criteria: overall competency/training; morale/dedication; and compensation/status.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 8/154 (tie)

Pervasiveness of Corruption

Corruption affects the potential for theft of nuclear materials and the rigor with which nuclear security measures are implemented.

See Subindicators

75/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 7/154 Tie

Pervasiveness of corruption

Corruption affects the potential for theft of nuclear materials and the rigor with which nuclear security measures are implemented.

Assessment Question:

How pervasive is corruption among public officials?

Answer:

Low (3)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How pervasive is corruption among public officials? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low The following factors are considered in this assessment: length that the regime or government has been in power; number of officials appointed rather than elected; frequency of reports or rumors of bribery; and perception of the degree to which public officials are involved in corrupt practices (eg, misuse of public office for private benefit, accepting bribes, dispensing favors and patronage for private gain).

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 11/154 (tie)

Vested interests/cronyism

Vested cronyism can affect the rigor with which nuclear security measures are implemented.

Assessment Question:

How pervasive is vested interests/cronyism among public officials?

Answer:

Low (3)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How pervasive is vested interests/cronyism among public officials? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 2/154 (tie)

Illicit Activities by Non-State Actors

The presence and capabilities of terrorist groups and prevalence of other illicit activities raises the risk of theft of nuclear materials.

See Subindicators

58/100 -9 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-12 where 12=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 40/154 Tie

Likelihood of terrorist attacks

The overall threat of terrorism provides context for the security threat posed by non-state groups.

Assessment Question:

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption to business operations?

Answer:

Very low (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption to business operations? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low This sub-indicator assesses the risk of a destabilizing terrorist attack, and therefore takes into account the country/area's current security outlook, political and economic stability, and resilience to such attacks.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 1/154 (tie)

Firearms seized during interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking

The availability of illicit arms impacts the ability of non-state groups to commit armed attacks.

Assessment Question:

How many firearms have been seized by law enforcement over the past 5 years?

Answer:

Very high (0)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How many firearms have been seized by law enforcement over the past 5 years? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low This sub-indicator assesses the number of weapons seized during interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking, as reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. These values are then distributed into quintiles, with 0 representing the highest quintile of weapon seizures and 4 representing the lowest.

Source:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Rank 124/154 (tie)

Pervasiveness of organized crime

Pervasive organized criminal activity in a country/area can increase opportunities for trafficking or smuggling illicit materials, such as nuclear and radiological materials.

Assessment Question:

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country/area?

Answer:

Low (3)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How high is the risk of organized criminal activity to the government or businesses in the country/area? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low The following factors are considered in this assessment: length that the regime or government has been in power; number of officials appointed rather than elected; frequency of reports or rumors of bribery; and perception of the degree to which public officials are involved in corrupt practices (eg, misuse of public office for private benefit, accepting bribes, dispensing favors and patronage for private gain).

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 11/154 (tie)

Environmental Risk

Climate change and environmental impacts like flooding and extreme heat can threaten the integrity and security of nuclear infrastructure facilities.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/154 Tie

Environmental vulnerability

Climate change and environmental impacts like flooding and extreme heat can threaten the integrity and security of nuclear infrastructure facilities.

Assessment Question:

What is the level of risk to physical infrastructure as a result of climate impacts?

Answer:

Very low (4)

Raw Indicator Score	Answer Choices
0	Very high
1	High
2	Moderate
3	Low
4	Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

What is the level of risk to physical infrastructure as a result of climate impacts? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low Note: To obtain the standardized scores, the sum of the physical risk factors as well as the adaptation capacity are scaled by a factor 0.725 so that the average score after adaptation capacity is equal to 1. Similarly, the weighted sum of the transition risk factors is multiplied by 2.520.

Source:

European Investment Bank

Rank 1/154 (tie)