Methodology: Theft and Sabotage

Summary

To gain a better understanding of current global nuclear security conditions, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) commissioned Economist Enterprise (formerly Economist Impact) to construct the latest edition of the NTI Nuclear Security Index (the 2026 NTI Index). The 2026 NTI Index provides a country- or area-level assessment of nuclear security conditions in 175 countries and Taiwan. It follows the release of six iterations of the NTI Index, in January 2012, January 2014, January 2016, September 2018, July 2020, and July 2023, respectively.

To ensure that the 2026 NTI Index reflects the recent developments in nuclear security conditions and policy landscape while enabling meaningful comparisons over time, NTI and Economist Enterprise reviewed and updated data for all editions of the NTI Index published since 2016 to provide 10 years of data for analysis. The 2012 and 2014 iterations were not updated or included in the 2026 NTI Index.

The 2026 NTI Index divides countries and areas into three groups, each with independent rankings and assessments. The first group of countries assessed in the NTI Index comprises the 22 countries with 1 kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials (this assessment results in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking for countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials). This ranking assesses actions related to securing materials against theft. The second group contains the 153 countries and Taiwan that have less than 1 kilogram of or no weapons-usable nuclear materials, but that could be used as safe havens, staging grounds, or transit points for illicit nuclear activities (the Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking for countries and areas without nuclear materials). This ranking assesses actions related to supporting global nuclear security efforts. The third and final group includes the 47 countries and Taiwan with certain types of nuclear facilities, the sabotage of which could result in a significant radiological release with serious off-site health consequences (the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking).¹ This ranking assesses actions related to protecting nuclear facilities against sabotage. The first edition of the NTI Index to include the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking was released in 2016.

Nuclear security is particularly difficult to observe, both because of the legacy of secrecy associated with the subject and because of the absence of quantitative performance indicators. To address the need for an objective, country- or area-level assessment of nuclear security, Economist Enterprise developed a multidimensional analytical framework, commonly known as a benchmarking index. A multidimensional framework is a useful way of measuring performance that cannot be directly observed—for example, a country’s or area’s economic competitiveness or, in this case, a country’s or area’s nuclear security conditions. Indices, in such cases, are effective in several ways: (a) they can aggregate a wide range of related data and evaluate it in a consistent manner; (b) they can track outcomes over time; and (c) they can spur countries to improve performance, especially relative to other countries in the index. Indices can therefore be a useful tool for stimulating public policy reforms. The goal of the NTI Index is not only to prompt improvements in nuclear security policies and programs but also to encourage international debate on the risks and other factors that affect the likelihood of a country or area losing control of its weapons-usable nuclear materials or a country’s or area’s nuclear facilities being subject to an act of sabotage.

The 2026 NTI Index is again the result of collaboration between NTI and Economist Enterprise. Economist Enterprise researched the metrics captured in the NTI Index, paying particular attention to any changes to regulations or licensing conditions in a country or area. As a result of updates and revisions to the NTI Index framework since previous editions, direct year-over-year comparisons would been impossible. To allow such comparisons, Economist Enterprise rescored countries or areas in the previous editions of the NTI Index using the updated 2026 framework and the data that would have been available when research for those editions was conducted.

In addition, the results from previous editions of the NTI Index were thoroughly reviewed and researched again to ensure accuracy. In a limited number of cases, research indicated that more information had become available, a relevant law or regulation had not been captured, or researchers disagreed on a score. In those instances, Economist Enterprise revised the previous scores to reflect the most accurate data. Rescoring those select data points was necessary for the 2026 NTI Index to capture accurate year-over-year comparisons. Most of the research was conducted between October 2025 and May 2026, although data were updated as new information became available until June 12, 2026.

NTI and Economist Enterprise once again drew on the expertise of highly respected nuclear security experts (the International Panel of Experts) from nuclear- and non–nuclear-weapons states, from countries and areas with and without nuclear materials, and from developed and developing nations to provide input on options for strengthening the 2026 NTI Index.

The categories in the Theft: Secure Materials and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities rankings are as follows:

1. Quantities and Sites, ² which captures the quantity of nuclear materials, the number of sites, the frequency of transport in a particular country or area, and whether quantities are increasing or decreasing
2. Security and Control Measures, which encompasses the core activities related to the physical protection and accounting of weapons-usable nuclear materials, personnel and security infrastructure, cybersecurity, and security culture
3. Global Norms, which includes actions that contribute to a strengthened global nuclear security architecture
4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity, which indicates how well a country or area has implemented its international commitments and a country’s or area’s capacity to do so
5. Risk Environment, which examines issues that can undermine nuclear security at the national level, such as political instability, absence of effective governance, corruption, or the illicit activities of nonstate actors.

The Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking consists of Categories 3, 4, and 5 from the Theft: Secure Materials ranking.

The research for both the Theft: Secure Materials and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities rankings primarily considered regulatory requirements for security. Taking a bottom-up approach and reviewing security at the facility or site level within each country or area was impossible, not least because of national security concerns. Researching domestic regulations also posed a challenge: some countries do not publish the majority of their nuclear security regulations; and two, Israel and North Korea, make no regulations public. Owing to these research challenges, Economist Enterprise used a variety of techniques to score certain countries (see the section titled “Research behind Selected Indicators”).

To limit the degree of subjectivity in these indicators, Economist Enterprise created subindicators that, whenever possible, were framed as a binary choice (yes or no, or 1 or 0). For example, Economist Enterprise asked whether physical protection is a condition for licensing in the country or area. If physical protection is a licensing requirement, the country or area is awarded one point; if it is not, the country or area scores a zero. A binary approach limits the risk of subjectivity and increases the likelihood that the same scores would be obtained by another set of researchers, a key measure of objectivity and analytical rigor. If a binary approach was inappropriate, the research team used a qualitative scoring approach.

Despite the care taken in designing these measures, no index of this kind can be perfect. Some countries or areas are particularly nontransparent in matters of nuclear security. In those cases, Economist Enterprise scored indicators using expert judgment or relied on proxy measures; for example, the sophistication of a country’s or area’s military operations was used to assess how well weapons-usable nuclear materials and nuclear facilities are protected in countries where the military is primarily responsible for that protection.

The indicators in the 2026 NTI Index are embedded in interactive data dashboards (available at www.ntiindex.org) that offer a wide range of analytical tools, allowing a deeper investigation of measures of nuclear security globally.³ For example, users can filter countries or areas by region or by membership in international organizations or multilateral initiatives. A user can directly compare two or more countries or areas and can examine correlations between indicators. Individual country or area profiles are also included in the 2026 NTI Index model, permitting a deeper dive into the nuclear security conditions in each country or area. Finally, the dashboards allow scores to be benchmarked against external factors that may potentially influence nuclear security. For example, the results of the Theft: Secure Materials ranking correlate well with regulatory quality (as measured by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators) and with those countries and areas that are most at peace (as measured by the 2025 Global Peace Index).

Methodology

General

The 2026 NTI Index includes three separate rankings. The first ranking assesses the nuclear materials security conditions in 22 countries that have 1 kilogram or more of weapons-usable nuclear materials (Theft: Secure Materials). This ranking assesses actions related to securing materials against theft. The ranking has 85 subindicators used to construct 22 indicators across five categories. The scope of Theft: Secure Materials ranking includes highly enriched uranium (HEU), including spent fuel and separated plutonium, including plutonium in unirradiated mixed oxide fuel (MOX). A second, separate ranking assesses the nuclear materials security conditions in 153 countries and Taiwan that have less than 1 kilogram of or no weapons-usable nuclear materials, but that could be used as safe havens, staging grounds, or transit routes (Theft: Support Global Efforts).⁴ This ranking assesses actions related to supporting global nuclear security efforts. The number of countries in the theft ranking for countries without materials was initially determined by the scope of the Operational Risk service of the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).⁵ The Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking has 35 subindicators across 10 indicators and three categories; the three categories are a subset of the five categories in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking. Finally, the third ranking assesses nuclear security conditions in 47 countries and Taiwan⁶ with certain types of nuclear facilities, the sabotage of which could lead to a significant radiological release with serious off-site health consequences (Sabotage: Protect Facilities).⁷ This ranking assesses actions related to protecting nuclear facilities against sabotage. The Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking has 20 indicators and 78 subindicators across five categories.

The overall score (0–100) for each country or area in each ranking is a weighted sum of the categories included in that ranking. Each category is scored on a scale of 0–100, where 100 represents the most favorable nuclear security conditions and 0 represents the least favorable conditions. A score of 100 in the ranking does not indicate that a country or area has perfect nuclear security conditions, and likewise a score of 0 does not mean that a country or area has no security; instead, the scores of 100 and 0 represent the highest or lowest possible score, respectively, as measured by the NTI Index criteria. Each category score is normalized on the basis of the sums of underlying indicators and subindicators and a weight is then applied. Weights are based on input from the International Panel of Experts and NTI and reflect the relative importance and relevance of each indicator and category. These weights differ between the three rankings to reflect that security priorities may differ in countries with or without weapons-usable nuclear materials and in countries with nuclear facilities.

The number of countries or areas and indicators in each of the three rankings has changed repeatedly since the framework’s inception in 2012. For example, the NTI Index Theft: Secure Materials ranking assessed the following:

• 2012: 32 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 18 indicators
• 2014: 25 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 19 indicators
• 2016: 24 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 20 indicators
• 2018: 22 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 20 indicators
• 2020: 22 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 21 indicators
• 2023: 22 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 21 indicators
• 2026: 22 countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials across 22 indicators

The steady decline in the number of countries within the Theft: Secure Materials ranking between 2012 and 2018 reflects the removal of all or most of such materials from the territories of 10 countries.⁸ The NTI Index Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking assessed 46 countries and Taiwan against 18 indicators in 2020. The number of countries and areas in the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking increased by 2 from 2018 to 2020 as a result of the construction of nuclear facilities in Jordan and the United Arab Emirates. No change occurred in the number of countries and areas included in any of the rankings between 2020 and 2023. However, between 2023 and 2026, the number of countries and areas in the sabotage ranking increased from 47 to 48, following the addition of Belarus and Turkey and the removal of Norway.

Index constraints and other important factors

In producing the NTI Index, Economist Enterprise relied on publicly available sources, such as laws and regulations, to reach initial scoring conclusions. The research team gathered data from the following types of sources:

• Primary legal texts and legal reports
• Government publications and reports
• Academic publications and reports
• Websites of government authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations
• EIU country rankings and reports (specifically “Operational Risk”)
• Local and international news media reports.

See the Selected Bibliography for more information on central sources.

The emphasis on publicly available sources has the benefit of creating a transparent and repeatable methodology, but it also presents some challenges. For example, regulations and other requirements for nuclear security are sometimes classified. In cases where no public information was available, those countries or areas were queried about the status of their regulations or licensing conditions as part of the data confirmation process. These countries or areas could then choose whether to provide additional insight into their regulatory requirements, which could then be considered in making a final scoring decision.

In cases where countries or areas are particularly nontransparent and chose not to respond to data confirmation queries, scores were assigned on the basis of a proxy indicator or the country was given a score of 0. The absence of information on nuclear security reduces public and international confidence in the security measures countries and areas are taking; thus, it is appropriate for those countries that do not make their regulations publicly available to receive low scores.

Although facility-level assessments would provide important “ground-truth” information, this level of granularity is currently impossible because of the sensitive nature of specific security arrangements. The NTI Index relies instead on the assumption that a country with the appropriate laws and regulations in place is more likely to have sound security procedures at each nuclear facility than a country without appropriate laws and regulations.

Additionally, the NTI Index includes “indicators” of security conditions and not the complete set of good security practices that nuclear faculties should use to protect against theft of weapons-usable nuclear materials or sabotage of nuclear facilities. For example, information regarding the types of locking mechanisms, surveillance systems, thickness of walls, and so forth is not publicly available for security reasons. The exclusion of specific security practices from the NTI Index does not reflect their lack of importance, but instead reflects the research constraints of the NTI Index.

Finally, please note that the NTI Nuclear Security Index does not directly address proliferation risks, smuggling or illicit trafficking, disarmament, or nuclear safety.

International Panel of Experts

As in previous years, NTI and Economist Enterprise drew on the expertise of highly respected nuclear security experts (the International Panel of Experts) from nuclear- and non–nuclear-weapons states, from countries and areas with and without materials, and from developed and developing nations to provide input on options for strengthening the 2026 NTI Index. This input included discussions on proposed changes to the NTI Index framework, with particular focus on the Risk Environment category, including approaches to measuring political stability, armed conflict, governance, corruption, illicit activities by nonstate actors, environmental vulnerability, and other emerging risks relevant to nuclear security. As in previous years, the panel also provided feedback on the relative importance of the Index categories and indicators, helping inform the default weighting scheme applied in the 2026 NTI Index. Economist Enterprise also received expert guidance from technical advisors throughout the research process. These technical advisors helped Economist Enterprise modify and refine indicators to capture key elements of nuclear security and provided insights into the more technical parts of the research.

Country and area scope

By reviewing recent reports pertaining to quantities of nuclear materials and taking into account recent developments, Economist Enterprise identified the following 22 countries (listed in alphabetical order) as having 1 kilogram or more of HEU (including spent fuel) or separated plutonium, including plutonium content in unirradiated MOX:

The 2026 NTI Index also assesses the following 154 countries and areas (listed in alphabetical order) that have less than 1 kilogram of weapons-usable nuclear materials or no weapons-usable nuclear materials:

The 2026 NTI Index also assesses the following 48 countries and areas (listed in alphabetical order) with nuclear facilities, the sabotage of which could result in a significant radiological release with serious off-site health consequences. Note that this list includes 20 of the countries in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking and 27 countries and Taiwan that are in the Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking.

Data review and confirmation process

After researching the indicators for each ranking, NTI and Economist Enterprise provided all 50 countries and areas included in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking with an opportunity to review and comment on Economist Enterprise’s preliminary results. The purpose of the data review and confirmation process was to ensure the accuracy of the 2026 NTI Index data. The research team also recognized that some countries might be willing, upon request, to provide Economist Enterprise with more detailed information than is readily available to the public.

To make this process as simple as possible, Economist Enterprise developed documents that presented the preliminary scores for the 2026 NTI Index indicators. These forms allowed the reviewers to either agree or disagree with the score selected for their country or area and, if a reviewer disagreed, offer an alternative answer and justification. Economist Enterprise used the submitted responses to reevaluate and potentially change a country’s or area’s scores. When the responses were unclear, Economist Enterprise contacted individuals for clarification. Country and area representatives had five weeks—from early May to mid-June 2026—to respond to the data review and confirmation request.

Of the 50 countries and areas contacted, 22 provided official responses to the data review and confirmation request:  Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Jordan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uzbekistan.⁹

Scoring

Subindicator scoring options range from binary observations (0, 1) to subindicators with 10 possible scores. For each subindicator, a higher value is associated with more favorable nuclear security conditions. For example, for the subindicator number of sites in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking, a country or area with 100 or more sites with nuclear materials is assigned a value of 0, whereas a country or area with 1 site is assigned a value of 3. The sum of the subindicator values is divided by the total possible subindicator values, then converted to a 0–100 scale to determine the indicator score. The sole exception to this scoring scheme is Indicator 3.2 Voluntary commitments. This indicator has 10 subindicators, of which 9 are scored on a binary scale (0, 1) and 1 is scored on a scale of 0–2. However, the total indicator score is capped at 6.¹⁰

Theft:
Secure Materials Ranking

The five categories of the Theft: Secure Materials ranking are as follows:

1. Quantities and Sites. This category comprises three indicators: Quantities of Nuclear Materials, Sites and Transportation, and Materials Production and Elimination Trends.
2. Security and Control Measures. This category comprises seven indicators: On-Site Physical Protection, Control and Accounting Procedures, Insider Threat Prevention, Physical Security during Transport, Response Capabilities, Cybersecurity, and Security Culture.
3. Global Norms. This category comprises four indicators: International Legal Commitments, Voluntary Commitments, International Assurances, and IAEA Nuclear Security Information Circulars.
4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity. This category comprises three indicators: UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 Implementation, Domestic Nuclear Materials Security Legislation, and Independent Regulatory Agency.
5. Risk Environment. This category comprises five indicators: Political Stability, Effective Governance, Pervasiveness of Corruption, Illicit Activities by Nonstate Actors, and Environmental Risk.

Each indicator within the five categories contains up to 10 underlying subindicators. The categories, indicators, and subindicators are as follows:

*Indicates new or revised indicator/subindicator. For more details on new and revised indicators/subindicators, see the section titled “Comparability between 2023 and 2026 NTI Indices.”

Theft:
Support Global Efforts Ranking

The three categories of the Theft: Support Global Efforts are a subset of the Theft: Secure Materials ranking. They comprise Categories 3 through 5 as follows:

3. Global Norms. This category comprises three indicators: International Legal Commitments, Voluntary Commitments, and IAEA Nuclear Security INFCIRCs.
4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity. This category comprises two indicators: UNSCR 1540 Implementation and Domestic Nuclear Materials Security Legislation.
5. Risk Environment. This category comprises five indicators: Political Stability, Effective Governance, Pervasiveness of Corruption, Illicit Activities of Nonstate Actors, and Environmental Risk.

Each indicator within the three categories contains 1 to 11 underlying subindicators. The categories, indicators, and subindicators are as follows:

*Indicates new or revised indicator/subindicator. For more details on new and revised indicators/subindicators, see the section titled “Comparability between 2023 and 2026 NTI Indices.”

Sabotage:
Protect Facilities Ranking

The five categories of the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking are as follows:

1. Number of Sites. This category comprises two indicators: Number of Sites and Plutonium Economy.
2. Security and Control Measures. This category comprises six indicators: On-Site Physical Protection, Control and Accounting Procedures, Insider Threat Prevention, Response Capabilities, Cybersecurity, and Security Culture.
3. Global Norms. This category comprises four indicators: International Legal Commitments, Voluntary Commitments, International Assurances, and IAEA Nuclear Security INFCIRCs.
4. Domestic Commitments and Capacity. This category comprises three indicators: UNSCR 1540 Implementation, Domestic Nuclear Security Legislation, and Independent Regulatory Agency.
5. Risk Environment. This category comprises five indicators: Political Stability, Effective Governance, Pervasiveness of Corruption, Illicit Activities of Nonstate Actors, and Environmental Risk.

Each indicator within the five categories contains up to 10 underlying subindicators. The categories, indicators, and subindicators are as follows:¹¹

# Denotes indicators and subindicators that are unique to the sabotage ranking.

† Denotes indicators and subindicators that are also in the theft ranking but have been adjusted to be specific to the sabotage of nuclear facilities.

* Indicates new or revised indicator/subindicator. For more details on new and revised indicators/subindicators, see the section titled “Comparability between 2023 and 2026 NTI Indices.”

Outcomes-based regulations

Security at nuclear facilities should not be static and must undergo continuous improvement. The most common approach to nuclear security historically has been for countries and areas to put in place prescriptive regulations with which nuclear operators must comply. However, regulations are not updated frequently, and they often lag behind developments in security practice or the types of threats against which nuclear operators need to protect.

Some countries and areas are moving away from prescriptive regulations for nuclear security toward more outcomes-based/results-based approaches, which might require a more flexible approach to scoring in the NTI Index. Rather than using national-level regulations that operators at facilities then implement, an outcomes-based regulatory approach sets parameters against which facilities must be protected (e.g., cyberattacks or armed attacks). The onus is on the licensee/operator to design specific procedures tailored to the facility to meet these overall security objectives. An outcomes-based approach provides licensees with a greater level of responsibility for shaping and implementing nuclear security at their nuclear facilities. This shift is designed to promote a more cooperative working relationship between the licensee and the regulator.

Advocates of outcomes-based regulation make a number of arguments to support this approach. First, in the absence of regulator-prescribed standards, licensees must take greater responsibility for the design and implementation of their security arrangements. Second, the regulator can foster an environment of innovation and continuous improvement in which licensees are encouraged to adopt novel security solutions that work in harmony with their business processes. Third, licensees have the flexibility to quickly review and optimize their arrangements in response to dynamic threat environments, which is not possible under a system of prescriptive regulations.

Throughout the research process, Economist Enterprise encountered several countries or areas that are shifting toward an outcomes-based approach, particularly in the area of personnel vetting and cybersecurity. For example, some countries or areas are employing “continuous” vetting of personnel. Rather than requiring alcohol or drug tests at fixed intervals, all personnel at facilities are trained to monitor the behavior of their colleagues continuously and to report any anomalies that are observed. These anomalies then result in a more formalized vetting procedure to identify the cause of aberrant behavior and to determine whether the behavior presents risks to the facility.

When countries or areas indicated they had outcome-based regulations, scores were adjudicated by Economist Enterprise on a case-by-case basis. An increasing number of countries or areas have adopted outcomes-based regulations since the NTI Index was first released in 2012, which has had a significant impact on the index methodology in recent iterations.

Calculating the 2026 NTI Nuclear Security Index

The subindicators listed are classified into indicators, and their values are summed and then set on a 0–100 scale to determine the value of the indicator:

indicator score = (Σ individual subindicators / Σ maximum subindicator scores) * 100

The category values are a weighted total of the indicators in the category:

category score = Σ weighted individual indicators

The category values have been normalized on the basis of the following equation:

x = (x − Min(x)) / (Max(x) − Min(x)),

where Min(x) and Max(x) are, respectively, the lowest and highest values in the NTI Index (i.e., out of the 22 countries with materials, out of the 153 countries and Taiwan without materials, or out of the 47 countries and Taiwan with nuclear facilities at risk of sabotage) for any given indicator. The normalized value (i.e., a score of 0–100) makes it directly comparable with other normalized indicator scores.

The following is an example of calculating the Category 1 score for Australia:

In this example, the normalized Category 1 score was calculated using a Max(x) value of 100 and Min(x) value of 0, as reflected in the data.

The overall score for each country or area is the weighted sum of the category scores, as determined by the weighting profile:

Overall score = Σ weighted category scores

The following is an example of calculating the overall score for Australia:

The countries with weapons-usable nuclear materials, countries and areas without weapons-usable nuclear materials, and countries and areas with nuclear facilities at risk of sabotage can then be ranked according to these parameters.

Model weights

The weights assigned to each category and indicator can be changed in the NTI Index data dashboards to reflect different assumptions about their relative importance. Three sets of weights are provided in all the data dashboards. The weights defined by NTI and Economist Enterprise are the default settings. They are based on extensive discussions between NTI, Economist Enterprise, and the International Panel of Experts on the relative value of each category and indicator. The second weighting option, called equal category weights, assumes all categories are equally important and evenly distributes weights on that basis. The third option, called equal indicator weights, assigns an identical weight to each indicator rather than to each category.

A fourth weighting option called principal components analysis (PCA) is included in the Theft: Secure Materials and Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking data dashboards. PCA is detailed further below.

The default setting uses expert judgment to assign weights to indicators, bringing a real-world perspective to the NTI Index. This perspective is important if the Index is to guide policy actions. The second and third options—in which all categories or indicators, respectively, are weighted equally—have the advantage of simplicity and do not involve subjective judgment. One disadvantage of these options is that they assume that all indicators or categories, respectively, are equally significant.

Weight Profile Defined by NTI and Economist Enterprise for the Theft: Secure Materials Ranking

Weight Profile Defined by NTI and Economist Enterprise for Theft: Support Global Efforts Ranking

Weight Profile Defined by NTI and Economist Enterprise for the Sabotage: Protect Facilities Ranking

Principal Components Analysis

The goal of PCA is to define quantitatively a weighting scheme for the indicators that are used to create a composite index or ranking of overall nuclear security. PCA is a method for removing redundant information shared across indicators by specifying a weighting that explains the most variance in the data.

PCA assigns each element in an index a weight that takes into account the covariance between indicators and the importance of a particular element in maximizing the variation in the index outcome (nuclear security conditions); in other words, it aims to minimize redundancy between variables and to maximize the variance with respect to the outcome. The weight is calculated by taking the principal component (eigenvector) associated with the highest explained variance (eigenvalue). Important assumptions for valid PCA are (a) the variance is meaningful and not the result of data with large measurement error, and (b) the dynamics of interest (nuclear security conditions) are along the direction with the largest variance.

Variation within indicator weights is a sign of redundancy in the elements or that some elements are not as relevant in explaining the variation in the overall index once all of the other variables are considered. Finding equal weights across indicators is a sign of very little redundancy across subgroups and similar relevance in explaining variation in the index, which suggests that the index was appropriately divided into subgroups.

The PCA-weights feature within the NTI Index models has been provided for those experts who may wish to explore the behavior of the framework in more depth. They should not be considered (a) as an alternative to the NTI/Economist Enterprise weights or (b) as a means of understanding country and area rankings and scores, because they do not consider the intrinsic significance of an indicator in the context of the NTI Index.

Weight Profile Defined by PCA for the Theft: Secure Materials Ranking

Weight Profile Defined by PCA for the Sabotage: Protect Facilities Ranking

Changes to the 2026 Nuclear Security Index Framework

NTI and Economist Enterprise made several changes to the NTI Index framework between 2023 and 2026 to raise the bar for nuclear security while maintaining the integrity of the 2023 framework for comparability. These changes are summarized in the following table.

This section provides greater detail on these changes, as well as how countries and areas were compared and the methodology used to facilitate the comparison between the 2023 and 2020 rankings.

In the 2026 edition of the Nuclear Security Index, NTI and Economist Enterprise added 12 new subindicators.

New indicators

Modified indicators

Comparability between 2023 and 2026 indices

To ensure an accurate year-over-year comparison, Economist Enterprise required identical datasets for each model for all years of the Index.¹² Modifying the Index framework prevents a direct comparison between the 2026 and previous indices (i.e., 2016–2023). To allow comparisons, Economist Enterprise undertook research to rescore the previous indices using the revised 2026 NTI Index framework. To do this, Economist Enterprise considered the information that would have been available during the period of initial research (e.g., July 2019 to March 2020 for the 2020 Index). In some cases, the scores that would have been assigned for previous indices were obvious based on the date of the relevant regulatory document. For example, if a country or area subscribed to INFCIRC/908 in 2017, Economist Enterprise would assign scores of 1 for that indicator for the 2018 and 2020 indices. When Economist Enterprise could not confirm whether a requirement had been in place during the previous research period, it either queried the governments during data confirmation or, when that was not possible, made reasonable assumptions based on whether regulatory changes at nuclear facilities had been instituted in recent years.

In addition to rescoring data for the new indicators, in a limited number of cases, Economist Enterprise adjusted previous scores because of new evidence. In all cases, if a previous score was deemed inaccurate, Economist Enterprise corrected the score to reflect the most up-to-date information available. Those adjustments help ensure that no artificial improvements or declines in scores are captured in the 2026 NTI Index. 

In a few instances, the responses to the 2026 data review and confirmation request contradicted their own responses from previous years. In those cases, Economist Enterprise first queried the government about the discrepancy; if Economist Enterprise did not receive a response to the query, additional research was undertaken and, in some cases, reasonable assumptions were made based on available sources.

Once Economist Enterprise had comparable datasets across the five NTI Index iterations (2016–2026), a year-over-year comparison could highlight where scores had improved, remained the same, or declined based on actions taken by countries or areas. The scores and rankings for the rescored indices were calculated using the same framework, methodology, and weights as described in the section titled “Calculating the 2026 NTI Nuclear Security Index.” Owing to the methodological change and updated scores described earlier, the normalized scores and ranks in the originally published 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2023 NTI Index models and reports are not comparable to the normalized scores and ranks in the newly rescored data for those years or to the scores and ranks in the 2026 model and report. To understand changes in scores between previous indices and 2026 resulting from actions taken by countries, users should use the 2026 dashboards and their comparison tools, rather than previous models.

Comparison between the Theft: Secure Materials Ranking and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities Ranking

Given the widespread danger of the threat of sabotage and the serious consequences that could result from a large radiological release, NTI and Economist Enterprise developed the sabotage assessment in the 2016 NTI Index. Countries and areas are selected for inclusion in the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking if they have (a) operating nuclear power reactors or nuclear power reactors that have been shut down within the past five years, (b) research reactors with a capacity of 2 megawatts or greater, (c) reprocessing facilities; or (d) spent fuel pools, only if the fuel has been discharged in the past five years and is not associated with an operating reactor. In 2026, NTI and Economist Enterprise identified 47 countries and Taiwan with such facilities. Twenty of these countries are in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking and 27 of the countries and Taiwan are in the Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking.

Although many of the indicators in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking framework and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking framework are the same, the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking framework is designed to specifically address protection of nuclear facilities against sabotage. Several of the subindicators in the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking are slightly different from their equivalent in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking to reflect differences in how nuclear facilities are protected against theft versus sabotage. In such cases, this will mean a country’s or area’s score for the same subindicator in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking and Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking may differ. Additionally, 9 sabotage-specific subindicators are included in the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking framework, and 15 subindicators that are included in the Theft: Secure Materials ranking are not included in the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking framework.¹³

The following chart shows the differences between the Theft: Secure Materials and Sabotage: Protect Facilities rankings. Those indicators that are marked n/a have not been included in their respective ranking framework; categories, indicators, and subindicators with asterisks have been altered in the sabotage ranking framework.

Research behind selected indicators

This section focuses on the research behind selected indicators and includes an explanation of the scoring framework behind several of the more complex variables created by Economist Enterprise. Scoring criteria for all the indicators are included in the Scoring section.

Approach

Economist Enterprise used its network of more than 900 country and area experts and regional specialists, many with local language skills, to undertake the research. However, given the reliance of the NTI Index on publicly available sources, researchers faced constraints in some areas because of the opaque nature of certain aspects of nuclear security. To address this lack of publicly available information and to reduce the subjectivity of the researchers, Economist Enterprise implemented specific scoring schemes and instituted strict scoring guidelines. These steps to address the lack of information or to reduce subjectivity are detailed in the following sections.

Challenging indicators

• 1.1 Quantities of Nuclear Materials (Theft: Secure Materials ranking)This indicator seeks to capture each country’s or area’s combined total quantity of highly enriched uranium, including spent fuel and separated plutonium, including plutonium content in unirradiated mixed oxide fuel. Materials that are owned by one country but are present in another are accounted for under the latter’s total. Plutonium content in MOX is either reported as such by a state or calculated as 5 to 8 percent of total MOX quantities. Quantities include materials in weapons components.The key challenge in researching quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials is the general lack of publicly available information in this area, particularly for nuclear-weapons states. Most countries and areas do not declare all their nuclear materials (including materials in weapon components). Economist Enterprise primarily relied on two sources for data (in addition to consulting national sources, where available): the IAEA and its INFCIRC 549 declarations (civilian plutonium, civilian MOX, civilian HEU) and the International Panel on Fissile Materials (military HEU and plutonium). In many cases, the sources use estimates or ranges of quantities that are based on the latest available information. Where quantities were provided in a range, Economist Enterprise used the midpoint (e.g., a range of 5–10 kilograms would be reported by Economist Enterprise as 7.5 kilograms).Owing to the uncertainties associated with quantities,¹⁴ Economist Enterprise banded the data into eight groups. This banding allows for slight variances in accounting for quantities without affecting scoring outcomes.
• 1.2 Number of Sites (Theft: Secure Materials ranking)
  This indicator seeks to capture how many sites (both military and civilian) with 1 kilogram or more of HEU, including spent fuel, or separated plutonium, including unirradiated MOX are present in a country or area. Significant challenges arose in researching this indicator. Unsurprisingly, many countries and areas do not publish the number or location of facilities with weapons-usable nuclear materials. There are sound national security reasons for not publicizing specific information on quantities and sites. Nevertheless, the lack of transparency in this area meant that Economist Enterprise had to use the limited publicly available information to estimate the number of sites. Owing to the uncertainty associated with these estimates, Economist Enterprise again banded the number of sites.
• 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 Radiological Consequences (Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking)
  These two subindicators assess whether countries and areas require the use of a graded approach to security for nuclear materials and equipment, systems, and devices, the sabotage of which could result in high radiological consequences. Economist Enterprise encountered many challenges when scoring this indicator. These challenges primarily centered on the distinction between safety and security. The subindicators in the NTI Index are designed to address security measures at nuclear facilities. Radiological consequences, however, are relevant to both safety and security concerns. The intersection between safety and security made the research challenging, particularly with regard to the protection of nuclear materials. In many cases, the regulations referenced protection against theft based on common categories of nuclear materials that are used by the IAEA (e.g., Category I, Category II). The IAEA does not apply these categories in the context of sabotage, but some countries or areas appear to do so. Ultimately, Economist Enterprise gave credit for these two subindicators only when the regulations specifically mentioned a graded approach to physical protection or increased levels of security for nuclear materials or equipment, systems, and devices taking into account the radiological consequences.
• 2.6/2.5 Cybersecurity (Theft: Secure Materials ranking and Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking)
  The Cybersecurity indicator includes seven subindicators on (a) mandatory cyber protection, (b) protection of sensitive digital assets against cyberattacks, (c) cybersecurity DBT, (d) tests and assessments, (e) cybersecurity capacity building, (f) cyber-incident response plans, and (g) mandatory cybersecurity awareness programs. Cybersecurity’s relatively recent inclusion in national nuclear regulations means that very little publicly available information exists. Some countries and areas address cybersecurity comprehensively in their national regulations; others are working to update their legislation to include cybersecurity. Yet many countries and areas with weapons-usable nuclear materials or nuclear facilities at risk of sabotage have no regulations that require cybersecurity at nuclear facilities. To receive credit for these subindicators, countries and areas must specifically include nuclear facilities in their cybersecurity plans. Credit is not given for laws and policies related to cybersecurity of general critical infrastructure.
• 3.3.3 Published nuclear security progress reports (Theft: Secure Materials ranking and Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking)
  This subindicator seeks to assess whether countries and areas have made public declarations about nuclear security progress. To apply consistent scoring criteria to this indicator, Economist Enterprise and NTI worked together to develop a strict scoring rubric. To be considered a public declaration on nuclear security progress, the declaration, statement, or report must include a substantial description of nuclear security practices. A declaration, statement, or report meets the criteria if it (a) is delivered in conjunction with an international, multilateral, or regional conference on nuclear security (e.g., IAEA’s International Conference on Nuclear Security, the IAEA General Conference, Global Partnership meetings, or a nuclear security treaty conference, such as the CPPNM Amendment or ICSANT) and (b) provides information about actions the country or area has taken to strengthen its own nuclear security (e.g., passing new legislation or regulations; reducing, eliminating, or consolidating nuclear materials; converting HEU to LEU; hosting a peer review; or other specific actions) or to strengthen the global nuclear security architecture (e.g., providing funds to the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Fund, supporting the IAEA’s nuclear security work, providing assistance to another country or area, or other specific actions). Reporting on treaty ratification only would not be considered a progress report. Furthermore, steps toward improving nuclear security must have been taken within two years of the report to qualify.
• 5.4 Illicit Activities of Nonstate Actors (Theft: Secure Materials ranking, Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking, Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking)
  As detailed in the previous “Modified Indicators” section, this indicator seeks to understand whether any terrorist or criminal groups that may be interested in illicitly acquiring weapons-usable nuclear materials or that may be interested in committing acts of nuclear terrorism more generally are present in a country or area and are capable of carrying out their goals. Details as to the extent of a group’s presence in a given country or area could not be easily ascertained. Owing to the nature of this topic, which has serious national security implications for states, publicly available information is limited. Nonetheless, Economist Enterprise and NTI worked with a group of technical advisors to craft four subindicators to approximate the general level of the terrorism threat in each country and area, taking into account the capabilities of groups, their cross-border nature, and the impact of nonterrorist illicit activities.

  The indicator comprises four subindicators that assess both domestic and regional threats from nonstate actors. Subindicator 5.4.1 assesses the likelihood of terrorist attacks, whereas Subindicator 5.4.2 captures illicit trafficking activity through the number of firearms seized during interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking. Subindicators 5.4.3 and 5.4.4 assess domestic and neighboring terrorism threats, respectively, based on data from the Global Terrorism Index.

Unlike previous editions of the NTI Index, which relied on bespoke assessments of terrorist group presence and capabilities, the 2026 framework incorporates GTI data to provide a more standardized and granular assessment of terrorism-related risks. The revised methodology enables a more consistent evaluation of the extent to which terrorist activity may affect nuclear security conditions within a country or area and across its surrounding region.

Challenging countries

Although each country and area posed unique research challenges, China, Iran, Israel, and North Korea were particularly complicated. China and Iran make regulations publicly available, but several regulatory areas in these countries remain confidential. Israel does not publicly acknowledge its nuclear program and therefore does not publish any regulations on nuclear security. As for North Korea, although there is some historical insight into the internal workings of its nuclear facilities/sites, it is minimal at best. In the interest of ensuring that the NTI Index is as accurate as possible, Economist Enterprise scored several indicators across these five countries using proxy scoring and expert input.

The following scoring methods were applied to these five countries to score the Theft: Secure Materials ranking and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking.

• Use of military proxy
  Iran, Israel, and North Korea were particularly difficult to score for the On-Site Physical Protection indicator (2.1). These countries are distinct among those countries for which Economist Enterprise could not find publicly available information in that they rely primarily on military (or, in the case of Israel, civil defense force) protection for nuclear sites. For Indicator 2.1, therefore, Economist Enterprise used a proxy indicator—military capability or sophistication—to score these countries. The only exception to this approach was Subindicator 2.1.5 Physical protection sustainability, which was added to the Theft with Materials and Sabotage frameworks in 2026. For this subindicator, these countries were assessed based on the scoring criteria specific to this subindicator rather than the military capability or sophistication proxy applied elsewhere within Indicator 2.1. The military capability or sophistication indicator is scored as follows:
  • A score of 0 means “very low”: no investment in military research and development (R&D). Principal equipment is very old or obsolete.
  • A score of 1 means “low”: minimal investment in military R&D. A high percentage of equipment is old and unsophisticated.
  • A score of 2 means “moderate”: investment of a small part of military expenditure in R&D. Principal equipment is a mixture of new and old and is moderately sophisticated.
  • A score of 3 means “high”: substantial investment in military R&D and in maintenance. Principal equipment is relatively modern and sophisticated and is well maintained.
  • A score of 4 means “very high”: huge investment in military R&D and armament production projects. Principal equipment is new and highly sophisticated.Although the maximum score for Indicator 2.1 is 7, the maximum score these three countries could receive was 6, where 6 represented the most favorable nuclear security conditions. The absence of information on nuclear security reduces public and international understanding of the security measures countries are taking. Therefore, receiving the highest possible score of 7 for Indicator 2.1 was inappropriate for states that were scored using a proxy. The maximum score of 6 reflects the combination of the military capability or sophistication score applied to Subindicators 2.1.1 through 2.1.4 and the separately determined score for Subindicator 2.1.5 Physical protection sustainability.

• Assumptions based on military control of materials
  For the following subindicators, the scores for Iran, Israel, and North Korea assume that the military imposes a strict regime under direct control of the state:
  • 2.3.1 Personnel vetting (Israel and North Korea only)
  • 2.4.1 Physical security during transport (Theft: Secure Materials ranking only)
  • 2.5.1 Emergency response capabilities
  • 2.5.2 Armed response capabilities
  • 2.5.3 Law enforcement response training
  • 2.6.1 Cybersecurity regulations (Israel only)

The unique approaches used for each country reflect the relative level of regulations available. For example, Iran makes publicly available its regulations on personnel vetting; however, it does not publish regulations on response capabilities. Yet because Iran’s state security and intelligence forces are responsible for security at the country’s nuclear sites, it can be inferred that internal, nonpublic regulations mandate the existence of such response capabilities. Similar assumptions are made across these other countries where regulations are not publicly available, and the military imposes a strict regime around nuclear security conditions.

• Expert input used
  Expert input or secondary sources were used to assign scores for the following indicators and subindicators:
  • 2.1.4 Tests and assessments (China only)
  • 2.2 Control and accounting procedures (North Korea only)
  • 2.2.5 Control measures (China only)
  • 2.3.1 Personnel vetting (China, North Korea, Russia)
  • 2.3.3 (China only)
  • 2.3.5 Insider threat awareness program (Russia only)
  • 2.4.1 Physical security during transport (North Korea only) (Theft: Secure Materials ranking only)
  • 2.7.1 Security culture (China only)
  • 4.3.1 (China and Russia only)China makes most of its nuclear security regulations publicly available and, for the first time in 2020, China participated in the data confirmation process, though some areas are ambiguous or remain confidential altogether. In these instances, Economist Enterprise has relied on expert input or secondary evidence to provide appropriate scores. For example, China’s regulations on personnel vetting do not clearly specify the required screening mechanisms (e.g., drug tests, background checks, mental fitness checks) for personnel; however, experts on Chinese nuclear policy have confirmed that personnel vetting mechanisms are applied across nuclear facilities.

• Israel
  Israel maintains a policy of opacity regarding its nuclear program. Israel does not publish any nuclear security–related laws or regulations that could be used in this research. Moreover, Economist Enterprise was unable to elicit expert opinion on Israel’s nuclear security conditions as it did for the other challenging countries. As already noted, owing to the lack of publicly available information, Economist Enterprise used proxies as a scoring technique for some indicators.

  Economist Enterprise did not use a proxy (military sophistication) or an assumption based on military (or similar body) protection of nuclear sites to score the Control and Accounting Procedures indicator (2.2). Material control and accounting is typically not in the purview of security personnel responsible for protecting nuclear materials. Economist Enterprise and its experts acknowledge that more than likely Israel has regulations on MC&A. However, Israel maintains an unusual lack of transparency regarding nuclear materials; thus, Economist Enterprise erred on the conservative side in its scoring. The burden of proof is on Israel to demonstrate that it has systems in place.

  In cases where security-related concerns are typically the responsibility of military or other trained personnel, Economist Enterprise did use proxies based on Israel’s military sophistication. For example, although Israel’s cybersecurity regulations are not publicly available, it has a military cyber unit within the Israel Defense Forces that defends the country’s critical cyber infrastructure. Economist Enterprise was able to make a confident assumption that Israel’s nuclear facilities are protected against cyberattacks. Economist Enterprise therefore provided partial credit to Israel on the cybersecurity indicator.

• Treatment of Taiwan in the NTI Index
  Taiwan is included in the Theft: Support Global Efforts ranking and the Sabotage: Protect Facilities ranking. Taiwan posed a unique research challenge, as it is not currently a member of the IAEA or a party to most international conventions owing to its status in the international community. However, it has well-established and publicly available regulations. Therefore, for the Security and Control Measures category Economist Enterprise reviewed Taiwan’s publicly available nuclear regulations and Atomic Energy Council legislation. Economist Enterprise also determined that for select indicators it was appropriate to score Taiwan on the basis of relevant domestic regulations and other considerations, as detailed below:

  • 3.1.1 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)
    Taiwan is not a party to the CPPNM. Economist Enterprise assigned credit to Taiwan based on provisions in its domestic regulations.

  • 3.1.2 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM
    Taiwan is not a party to the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM. Economist Enterprise has given Taiwan credit on this subindicator based on its domestic regulations and the U.S.-Taiwan 123 Agreement for Peaceful Cooperation, which legally binds Taiwan to follow the CPPNM and the 2005 Amendment. The U.S.-Taiwan 123 Agreement came into force on June 22, 2014. Therefore, Taiwan receives credit for the 2005 CPPNM Amendment in the 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2023 NTI Index, but not in the 2012 or 2014 editions, as no evidence exists that the provisions of the 2005 CPPNM Amendment were legally binding before the 123 Agreement.

  • 4.1.1 UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 reporting and 4.1.2 Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation
    Because Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations, it is not obliged to—and in fact cannot—provide a UNSCR 1540 Report to the 1540 Committee. Despite this, Economist Enterprise assigned credit to Taiwan for a report and matrix it has drafted, modeled on 1540 reports, which is publicly available on Taiwan’s Atomic Energy Council’s website. Economist Enterprise also reviewed and scored this matrix against the same criteria used to assess other 1540 reports. Treating Taiwan’s matrix like other countries’ matrices, Economist Enterprise has assigned credit based on the number of elements of UNSCR 1540 that have been implemented as reflected in the matrix.

  • 4.2.1 CPPNM implementation authority
    Economist Enterprise assigned credit to Taiwan on the basis of having a national authority for the implementation of nuclear security regulations.

  • 4.2.2 National legal framework for CPPNM Amendment
    Economist Enterprise assigned credit to Taiwan on the basis of provisions in its domestic regulations.

Selected Bibliography

Note: Economist Enterprise qualitative assessments are based on official national sources, which vary by country and area.

Common primary and secondary sources

• Cann, Michelle, Kelsey Davenport, and Jenna Parker. The Nuclear Security Summit: Progress Report on Joint Statements. Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, March 2015. www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA_NSS_Report_2015.pdf.
• IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities Database, infcis.iaea.org/NFCFDB/facilities.
  • Research Reactor Database, nucleus.iaea.org/rrdb/home.
  • Website, www.iaea.org/.
• Institute for Science and International Security. Website, www.isis-online.org/.
• IPFM (International Panel on Fissile Materials). Global Fissile Material Report 2022: Fifty Years of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, and Nuclear Energy. Princeton, NJ: IPFM, 2022. https://fissilematerials.org/library/gfmr22.pdf
• James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Website, cns.miis.edu/.
• United Nations. Treaty Collection website, treaties.un.org/.
• U.S. Department of State. Website, www.state.gov/.
• U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration. Website, nnsa.energy.gov/.
• WINS (World Institute for Nuclear Security). Website, www.wins.org.
• World Nuclear Association. Nuclear Power Reactors website, world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-power-reactors.

Sources for Political Stability (5.1), Effective Governance (5.2) and Pervasiveness of Corruption (5.3)

• EIU (Economist Intelligence Unit). “Operational Risk,” www.eiu.com.
• Fragile States Index. Analytics website, fragilestatesindex.org/.
• Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Conflict Barometer 2024, https://hiik.de/.

Sources for Illicit Activities of Nonstate Actors (5.4)

• ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Event Data). Website, acleddata.com/.
• Institute for Economics and Peace. Global Terrorism Index. Website, www.economicsandpeace.org/global-terrorism-index/.
• United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Website, www.unodc.org.

Source for Environmental Risk (5.5)

• European Investment Bank. Website, www.eib.org/en/index.

Sources for filter and highlight groups in NTI Index models

• Nuclear Power Programs
  • IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Nuclear Power Reactors in the World. Vienna: IAEA, 2025.
    • Power Reactor Information System. Website, pris.iaea.org/PRIS/CountryStatistics/CountryStatisticsLandingPage.aspx.
• Planned or Proposed Nuclear Power Programs
  • World Nuclear Association. “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries.” Last updated May 27, 2026. www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx.