Methodology: Radioactive Source Security Assessment

Summary

To better understand global trends in radioactive source security, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) commissioned Economist Enterprise (formerly Economist Impact) to construct the third edition of the Radioactive Source Security Assessment. The Radioactive Source Security Assessment measures national policies, commitments, and actions governing radioactive sources, as well as the risks associated with radioactive sources, across 175 countries and Taiwan.

The Radioactive Source Security Assessment groups policies, commitments, actions, and factors that affect the overall risk environment into a four-part framework:

• National Measures: The national measures in place to manage and secure radioactive sources
• Global Norms: The country’s or area’s international commitments and support for global norms on radioactive source security
• Alternative Technologies: The country’s or area’s commitment to introducing alternative technologies to replace high-activity radioactive source applications
• Risk Environment: The risk environment and its potential effect on the security of radioactive sources.

Given that radioactive sources are present around the world, indicators within each of these four categories were selected for their application on a global scale. They represent data points that are relevant and important to radioactive sources and their security, are readily available for all or most countries or areas, and do not require in-depth research into laws and regulations. As a result, indicators may not independently paint a complete picture of the radiological security environment.

Additionally, the framework does not produce scores or rankings of countries or areas, unlike the rankings in the Nuclear Security Index. Together, however, these data points provide insight into priorities for improving the governance and security of radioactive sources, serve to reinforce global norms, and provide a foundation for future in-depth analysis.

A panel of radiological security experts informed the development of this framework and its associated indicators. The experts helped identify priorities for radioactive source security and available data sources.

The indicators in the Radioactive Source Security Assessment are embedded in an interactive data dashboard (available at www.ntiindex.org) that offers a wide range of analytical tools, allowing for a deeper investigation of measures of radiological security globally.¹ For example, users can filter countries and areas individually, by region, or by membership in international organizations or multilateral initiatives. This dashboard shares many of the same features as the Nuclear Security Index dashboards, providing easy access for users who are familiar with the Nuclear Security Index.

Assessment Criteria and Categories

The 2026 Radioactive Source Security Assessment has a four-part framework. Each of the four categories includes between two and five indicators. Details of these indicators follow.

National Measures (Category A)

This category assesses a country’s or area’s domestic policies, commitments, and actions for managing and securing radioactive sources through five indicators. The first two indicators ask whether a country or area has an independent regulatory body to provide oversight over radioactive sources and whether a country’s or area’s domestic laws and regulations explicitly require security (not just safety) measures to be in place to protect radioactive sources. The third indicator assesses whether the country or area maintains a national registry of radioactive sources, a key step in tracking and accounting for sources at the national level. The fourth indicator assesses whether the country or area has the authority to inspect facilities with radioactive sources. The fifth indicator asks whether licensing requirements exist for the export of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Category I² radioactive sources.

Global Norms (Category B)

This category assesses a country’s or area’s international commitments and support for global norms around radioactive sources through three indicators. The first indicator examines the extent of each country’s or area’s commitments within the context of the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, including a country’s or area’s (a) political commitment to the Code of Conduct, (b) political commitment to the Supplemental Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources and the related actions to nominate a point of contact and submit answers to the Import and Export Questionnaire, and (c) political commitment to the Supplemental Guidance on the Management of Disused Radioactive Sources.

The second indicator assesses whether a country or area participates in international organizations or conferences related to the security of radioactive sources. This includes whether a country or area participates in the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (FTPRNT). It also captures whether or not a country or area has sent an official delegation to the IAEA’s International Conference on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, held in 2022.³ Please note that in the 2023 assessment, this indicator captured countries’ and areas’ participation at the 2022 conference. As no subsequent conference has taken place since 2022, the 2026 assessment continues to assess countries and areas on the basis of their participation in the 2022 conference.

The third indicator measures whether the country or area is a party to three international legal agreements related to radiological security: (a) the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,  (b) the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and (c) the Convention on Assistance in the Case of Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

Alternative Technologies (Category C)

The third category assesses a country’s or area’s commitment to supporting the development and implementation of alternative technology to high-activity radioactive sources. This category captures each country’s or area’s commitment through two proxy indicators: intent and implementation.⁴

The first indicator assesses intent by asking whether a country or area has subscribed to IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) 910, which was derived from the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High-Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources (HASS). Among other commitments, INFCIRC/910 calls on countries and areas to support the development of non-HASS technologies (whether isotopic or not) through research and development and to promote them as far as technically and economically feasible. The second indicator assesses implementation by asking whether a country or area has publicly declared a regulatory requirement, policy, or commitment to implementing alternative technology to high-activity radioactive sources.

Risk Environment (Category D)

The final category assesses a country’s or area’s risk environment through four indicators: (a) political stability, (b) effective governance, (c) pervasiveness of corruption, and (d) illicit activities by nonstate actors. The first three of these indicators (political stability, effective governance, and pervasiveness of corruption) are directly incorporated from the Nuclear Security Index and consist of several subindicators. These subindicators include, among other things, the presence of armed conflict, the effectiveness of a country’s or area’s political system, and the extent of corruption and vested interests/cronyism in the country’s or area’s public and private sectors.⁵

The fourth indicator assesses illicit activities of nonstate actors, including terrorist groups and criminal networks through three subindicators: (a) the likelihood of terrorist attacks, (b) the risk of organized crime, and (c) the number of firearms seized as part of the interdiction of illicit arms trafficking.5

The categories, indicators, and subindicators are described in detail in the following table.

* Denotes indicators that were directly incorporated from the Nuclear Security Index.

Assessment Constraints and Other Important Factors

The Radioactive Source Security Assessment is the first worldwide assessment of radiological security. As such, it not only provides interesting insights into the status of radiological security but also serves as a feasibility study to determine the availability of information needed to assess radiological security around the world. The Radioactive Source Security Assessment relies on publicly available information, which means the methodology is transparent and repeatable. Unlike the research conducted for the Nuclear Security Index, Economist Enterprise did not conduct in-depth country and area research into laws and regulations across much of the framework. However, for a limited number of qualitative indicators, Economist Enterprise conducted targeted research into publicly available laws, regulations, and policies.⁶ For the remaining indicators, Economist Enterprise relied on publicly available information that is easily accessible from existing databases or other consolidated resources. As a result of these research constraints, certain factors relevant to radiological security—such as the number of IAEA Category 1–2 radioactive sources in each country or area (information that is not publicly available) or other regulatory requirements that might exist in some countries or areas (requiring in-depth research)—were not included in the assessment.

For a limited set of indicators, a result of “no” can represent either a negative response to the question or that no data are available. This option has been applied to indicators where there is a clear lack of publicly accessible data. Although Economist Enterprise conducted targeted legal and regulatory research for selected indicators, the assessment’s limited scope precluded in-depth research for each country or area to determine the availability of data. It should also be noted that the Radioactive Source Security Assessment represents a selection of indicators of security conditions and not a comprehensive set of actions that countries and areas and their respective facilities should adopt to protect against the theft or sabotage of radioactive sources. For example, information regarding the types of physical protection measures, such as locking mechanisms or surveillance systems mandated at facilities with radioactive sources, is not publicly available for security reasons. The exclusion of specific security practices from the Radioactive Source Security Assessment does not reflect their lack of importance. Rather, it reflects the assessment’s goal of setting a baseline understanding of the status of radiological security worldwide, as well as the research constraints.

Methodology

The Radioactive Source Security Assessment comprises categories that are related to the radiological security conditions for each country and area.

To collect data for the 2026 Radioactive Source Security Assessment, the Economist Enterprise research team gathered data from the following sources:

• IAEA and international organization publications and reports
• Primary legal and regulatory texts
• National statements at multilateral events, such as the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit and the 2024 IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security
• Academic publications
• Data collected by government authorities, international organizations, and research organizations, such as the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
• EIU proprietary country and area rankings and reports (specifically, “Operational Risk”).

See the Selected Bibliography for more information on central sources.

Given the widespread use of radioactive sources in sectors as diverse as healthcare, agriculture, and industry, the 2026 Radioactive Source Security Assessment assumes that radioactive sources are present in or transported through each of the 175 countries and Taiwan included in the assessment. These countries and areas are listed below in alphabetical order.

Research Behind Selected Indicators

This section focuses on the research behind selected indicators and includes an explanation for the answer choices behind several of the more complex variables created by Economist Enterprise. Scoring criteria for all the indicators are included in the section titled “Assessment Criteria and Categories.”

A.1 Regulatory Oversight

Indicator A.1 assesses whether the country or area maintains a regulatory body with oversight of radioactive sources. These data are available through the IAEA Directory of National Regulatory Bodies for the Control of Radiation Sources. By using the IAEA Directory, the assessment identifies countries and areas that have a regulatory body with oversight of any aspect of radioactive sources. Indicator A.2 then assesses whether a country’s or area’s regulatory body has oversight over the security of radioactive sources, specifically.

C.1–C.2 Alternative Technology: Intent; Implementation

In evaluating a country’s or area’s commitment and capacity to adopt alternative technologies, Economist Enterprise relied on publicly available information to evaluate intent and implementation.

To measure intent in Indicator C.1, Economist Enterprise used country or area support for IAEA INFCIRC/910, the Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High-Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources, as a proxy. One of the commitments in INFCIRC/910 is to support the development of non-HASS technologies (whether isotopic or not) through research and development and to promote them as far as technically and economically feasible.

To measure implementation (Indicator C.2), Economist Enterprise conducted a review of official government documents, including (a) national laws, (b) policy statements, (c) regulatory authority publications, (d) national reports submitted to the IAEA, (e) Nuclear Security Summit national progress reports, and (f) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 reports. Countries and areas received credit where publicly available evidence demonstrated a regulatory requirement, policy, or commitment to implementing alternative technologies to replace high-activity radioactive sources.

D.1–D.4 Risk Environment: Political Stability; Effective Governance; Pervasiveness of Corruption; Illicit Activities by Nonstate Actors

The Risk Environment category comprises four indicators. The scores for Effective Governance and Pervasiveness of Corruption indicators, along with three of the five subindicators in the Political Stability indicator and two of the three subindicators in the Illicit Activities by Nonstate Actors indicator are based on proprietary information contained in the Operational Risk assessment produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit.

The Operational Risk assessment, which is updated once per quarter, considers present conditions and expectations for future conditions. The EIU forecasts future risk conditions rather than simply extrapolating present trends into the future. The comparability of the qualitative assessments is made more rigorous by the extensive guidance provided to the EIU’s team of over 900 country analysts who undertake the research for each indicator. Analysts can constantly view the scoring for other countries and areas, which enables consistency across geographies. Additional oversight is provided by the editorial team, which includes risk heads for every region.

The EIU also conducts an annual global audit of all the scores. Ultimately, the ratings and scores rely on the expert opinion of the EIU’s analysts, who work in regional teams that have extensive knowledge of events and conditions in both the countries and areas, and the region.

The EIU’s 900-plus analysts have a wide range of open and closed sources at their disposal. They are based in virtually every country and area throughout the world and can analyze recent market developments and forecast political, economic, and business trends. In addition, they provide detailed, regular information on conditions within a country or area. The analysts also draw on the analytic work already developed at the EIU, as well as open sources. International open sources include publications from the United Nations, Central Intelligence Agency, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, International Institute for Management Development, International Labour Organization, and Interpol.

D.4.3 Firearms seized during interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking

Unlike much of the rest of the Risk Environment category, Subindicator D.4.3 does not rely on EIU data. It measures the number of weapons seized during the interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking over the past five years. This indicator was included to approximate the prevalence of smuggling routes, which increase the chances that stolen or lost radioactive material will end up in the hands of nonstate or terrorist networks. The data on gun seizures are collected and published by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. Economist Enterprise collated these data and banded each country or area into quintiles (A = Very low, B = Low, C = Moderate, D = High, E = Very high) on the basis of the number of weapons seized. The countries or areas with the highest number of seizures receive a rating of “E = Very high,” whereas countries or areas with few seizures receive a rating of “A = Very low.” Data on weapons seizures were limited to approximately half of the 175 countries and Taiwan included in this assessment. Countries and areas for which data on weapons seizures were unavailable were given a rating of “X = No data.”

Selected Bibliography

• Fragile States Index. Analytics website, fragilestatesindex.org/.
• Global FTPRNT (Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism). Website, globalftprnt.org/.
• Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. Conflict Barometer 2025, hiik.de/.
• IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency). Code of Conduct Status List. Last updated August 26, 2025, nucleus.iaea.org/sites/ns/code-of-conduct-radioactive-sources/Documents/Status_list%2026%20August%202025.pdf.
  • Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency Status List. Last updated September 17, 2025, www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/cacnare_status.pdf.
  • Directory of National Regulatory Bodies for the Control of Radiation Sources. Vienna: IAEA, January 6, 2022, www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/reg-auth-directory.pdf.
  • INFCIRC/910, Concerning a Joint Statement on Strengthening the Security of High-Activity Sealed Radioactive Sources, December 30, 2016, www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/communication-dated-30-december-2016-received-from-the-permanent-mission-of-france-concerning-a-joint-statement-on-strengthening-the-security-of-high-activity-sealed-radioactive-sources.
  • Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management Status List. Last updated March 5, 2026. www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/06/jointconv_status.pdf.
  • Website, www.iaea.org/.
• United Nations. Treaty Collection website, treaties.un.org/.
• UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). Illicit arms flow data. dataunodc.un.org/dp-firearms-arms-seized.