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2026 Recommendations and Scores for

Russian Federation

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47/100 -7 Score Change from 2023

Rank 18/22 Tie

Actions to take

Adopt a nuclear security culture

  • Incorporate security culture language into domestic laws and regulations (done)

Capitalize on the upcoming revision of Information Circular 225

  • Contribute to the revision process of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 through participation in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee, and provide specific input on how to strengthen provisions regarding insider threat mitigation, cybersecurity systems, continuous threat assessment, and emerging technologies (done)

Consolidate recent progress into a new era of enduring leadership

  • Commit to a coordinated effort to provide long-term financial and technical support for developing strong nuclear security regimes to countries embarking on new nuclear applications, leveraging specific national expertise to provide relevant support where needed
  • Provide consistent financial contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund

Deepen engagement with the international nuclear security community

  • Ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) (done)
  • Send a ministerial-level delegations to the International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS)
  • Join the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism (Global FTPRNT)

Eliminate excess highly enriched uranium through conversion and downblending

  • Operate no enrichment facilities that handle HEU
  • Actively decrease the total stockpile of weapons-usable nuclear materials within the country
  • Make regular public declarations and reports about civilian stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material
  • Make regular public declarations and reports about military stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material

Institute all-hazards frameworks and leverage legal protections for nuclear infrastructure

  • Adopt an all-hazards framework that emphasizes common functional capabilities rather than planning for specific disasters, including designation of nuclear facilities as a critical infrastructure sector and identification of a coordinating government authority, and require that these plans be tested at defined intervals to translate awareness and prioritization of risks into operational readiness
  • Conduct annual joint exercises between on-site and off-site responders to improve coordination capabilities and to correct any problems before a real emergency
  • Ratify the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, a 1977 amendment that, among other commitments, prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities
  • Reinforce international norms against targeting nuclear facilities during war by endorsing and adhering to the IAEA’s Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict

Minimize weapons-usable nuclear material by committing to permanent disposal of spent nuclear fuel

  • Fully license at least one site for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel
  • Commit to forgo reprocessing of nuclear fuel and act upon that commitment
  • Operate no reprocessing facilities handling HEU or separated plutonium (including plutonium comingled with uranium and/or transuranics)

Prioritize personnel-related security measures

  • Establish comprehensive personnel vetting programs that require background checks, psychological screening, and drug testing (done)
  • Require that security and other personnel with access to nuclear material areas are vetted at specified intervals
  • Establish protocols for personnel to report suspicious behavior
  • Require all personnel to participate in training programs on insider threats
  • Mandate annual nuclear security culture self-assessments

Reverse nuclear security decline

  • Establish an independent regulatory body with political and financial autonomy, legal authority, and sufficient resources to oversee nuclear security measures (done)
  • Mandate annual nuclear security culture self-assessments
  • Establish protocols for personnel to report suspicious behavior
  • Require all personnel to participate in training programs on insider threats
  • Require all personnel to participate in training programs on cyber threats
  • Make regular public declarations and reports about civilian stocks of weapons-usable nuclear material

Strengthen regulatory bodies and technical institutions to sustain nuclear security regimes

  • Require the use of a Design Basis Threat that must be regularly updated
  • Establish regulatory requirements for tests and assessments of security systems conducted by a competent authority, including force-on force exercises, designed with realistic threat considerations
  • Create a Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) or a non-NSSC institution that demonstrates core nuclear security sustainability competencies (done)
  • Develop institutions that can conduct research and strategic planning on cybersecurity in coordination with nuclear regulatory authorities, translating technical expertise into regulations and guidance (done)
  • Require personnel with security responsibilities to undergo additional training or certification that builds upon existing training for non-security personnel

Use the 2027 Review Conference for the Amended CPPNM to advance ratification and strengthen implementation

  • Sign and ratify the CPPNM (done)
  • Ratify, accept, or approve the Amended CPPNM (done)
  • Create a CPPNM implementation authority (done)
  • Complete a national legal framework for the Amended CPPNM and submit relevant legislation to the IAEA as stipulated in Article 14.1 of the Convention (done)

How Russian Federation scored

QUANTITIES AND SITES

The Quantities and Sites category captures the quantity of nuclear materials, the number of sites, and the frequency of transport in a particular country/area, all related to the risk that materials could be stolen. This category is comprised of the total quantities of HEU (including spent fuel), separated Pu and the Pu content in unirradiated mixed oxide (MOX), and the number of sites and frequency of transport of these materials. In addition, it includes a leading indicator as to whether the country/area is increasing or decreasing its overall material quantities.

0/100 -20 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 22/22

Quantities of Nuclear Materials

The larger the quantity of nuclear material held, the greater the materials management requirements and potential risk that materials could be stolen.

See Subindicators

0/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 21/22 Tie

Close

Quantities of nuclear materials

Facilities handling highly enriched uranium (HEU) and unirradiated plutonium pose heightened security and proliferation risks due to the direct weapons usability of these materials and the challenges of accurate accounting in bulk processing. Measuring the number of such facilities reflects the scale of a country’s exposure to potential nuclear material diversion and the complexity of maintaining effective control and safeguard systems.

Assessment Question:

What is the country's combined total quantity of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium including separated plutonium (Pu) and unirradiated mixed oxide fuel (MOX)?

Answer:

500 tonnes or greater (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 500 tonnes or greater
1 100-499 tonnes
2 10-99.99 tonnes
3 2-9.99 tonnes
4 500kg-1.99 tonnes
5 100-499kg
6 21-99kg
7 5-20kg
8 Less than 5kg

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

What is the country's combined total quantity of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium including separated plutonium (Pu) and unirradiated mixed oxide fuel (MOX)? 0 = 500 tonnes or greater 1 = 100-499 tonnes 2 = 10-99.99 tonnes 3 = 2-9.99 tonnes 4 = 500kg-1.99 tonnes 5 = 100-499kg 6 = 21-99kg 7 = 5-20kg 8 = Less than 5kg

Source:

Institute for Science and International Security; James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies; IAEA INFCIRC 549 declarations; International Panel on Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2013.

Rank 21/22 (tie)

Sites and Transportation

The greater the number of sites with nuclear materials and the frequency of transport of those materials, the greater the potential risk of security breaches.

See Subindicators

0/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-11 where 11=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 22/22

Close

Number of sites

The greater the number of nuclear facilities, the greater the potential for acts of

Assessment Question:

How many sites (both military and civilian) with one kilogram or greater quantities of HEU (including spent fuel) and Pu (including separated Pu and unirradiated mixed oxide fuel) does the country maintain?

Answer:

100 sites or greater (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 100 sites or greater
1 11-99 sites
2 2-10 sites
3 One site

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How many sites (both military and civilian) with one kilogram or greater quantities of HEU (including spent fuel) and Pu (including separated Pu and unirradiated mixed oxide fuel) does the country maintain? 0 = 100 sites or greater 1 = 11-99 sites 2 = 2-10 sites 3 = One site

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 21/22 (tie)

Reprocessing facilities

By separating heavy metals from radioactive fission products, reprocessing introduces weapons-usable nuclear material into the fuel cycle.

Assessment Question:

How many reprocessing facilities handling HEU or Pu (including separated Pu and unirradiated MOX) does the country have?

Answer:

3 or more reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX or the number of facilities is not disclosed (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 3 or more reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX or the number of facilities is not disclosed
1 2 reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX
2 1 reprocessing facility handling HEU, Pu, or MOX
3 No reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How many reprocessing facilities handling HEU or Pu (including separated Pu and unirradiated MOX) does the country have? 0 = 3 or more reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX or the number of facilities is not disclosed 1 = 2 reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX 2 = 1 reprocessing facility handling HEU, Pu, or MOX 3 = No reprocessing facilities handling HEU, Pu, or MOX

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 19/22 (tie)

Enrichment facilities

Enrichment facilities handling HEU increase the availability and handling of weapons-usable nuclear materials, heightening the risk of theft, diversion or misuse. Tracking the number of facilities helps assess a country’s potential exposure to nuclear security threats and the extent of safeguards required. Enrichment facilities handling only LEU are not included as there are no weapons-usable materials present.

Assessment Question:

How many enrichment facilities handling HEU does the country have?

Answer:

4 or more enrichment facilities handling HEU or the number of facilities is not disclosed (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 4 or more enrichment facilities handling HEU or the number of facilities is not disclosed
1 2-3 enrichment facilities handling HEU
2 1 enrichment facility handling HEU
3 No enrichment facilities handling HEU

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How many enrichment facilities handling HEU does the country have? 0 = 4 or more enrichment facilities handling HEU or the number of facilities is not disclosed 1 = 2-3 enrichment facilities handling HEU 2 = 1 enrichment facility handling HEU 3 = No enrichment facilities handling HEU

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 20/22 (tie)

Frequency of materials transport

Given that nuclear material is particularly vulnerable during transport, the lower the frequency of transfer of material, the lower the potential risk of security breaches. The NTI Index assesses whether nuclear materials (HEU or Pu including separated Pu and unirradiated MOX) are transported either domestically or internationally and assigns scores accordingly.

Assessment Question:

Are nuclear materials (HEU, HEU or Pu including separated Pu and unirradiated MOX) transported either domestically or internationally?

Answer:

Yes, transported domestically or internationally and the country/area is one of nine nuclear-armed states (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Yes, transported domestically or internationally and the country/area is one of nine nuclear-armed states
1 Yes, domestically or internationally
2 No or only for repatriation

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Are nuclear materials (HEU, HEU or Pu including separated Pu and unirradiated MOX) transported either domestically or internationally? 0 = Yes, transported domestically or internationally and the country/area is one of nine nuclear-armed states 1 = Yes, domestically or internationally 2 = No or only for repatriation

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 14/22 (tie)

Material Production / Elimination Trends

Increasing or decreasing the quantities of nuclear material in a state changes the potential risk of materials being stolen.

See Subindicators

0/100 -75 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 15/22 Tie

Close

Material production / elimination trends

Increasing or decreasing the quantities of nuclear material in a state changes the potential risk of materials being stolen.

Assessment Question:

The country is doing the following in regards to its total stock of nuclear materials:

Answer:

The total stock of nuclear materials is increasing (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 The total stock of nuclear materials is increasing
3 The total stock of nuclear materials remains unchanged
4 The total stock of nuclear materials is decreasing

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

The country is doing the following in regards to its total stock of nuclear materials: 0 = The total stock of nuclear materials is increasing 3 = The total stock of nuclear materials remains unchanged 4 = The total stock of nuclear materials is decreasing

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 15/22 (tie)

SECURITY AND CONTROL MEASURES

The Security and Control Measures category encompasses the core activities directly related to protection and accounting of nuclear materials. It includes indicators of physical protection, control and accounting, insider threat prevention, security during transport, response capabilities, cybersecurity and security culture.

71/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 12/22

On-site Physical Protection

Essential measures for securing sites and facilities.

See Subindicators

71/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-7 where 7=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 12/22 Tie

Close

Mandatory physical protection

Requiring licensees to provide physical protection increases the likelihood that nuclear facilities will meet stricter standards.

Assessment Question:

Is physical protection a condition for licensing?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is physical protection a condition for licensing? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/19 (tie)

On-site reviews of security

On-site reviews of security increase the likelihood that physical protection measures meet prescribed standards and will be maintained.

Assessment Question:

Are on-site reviews of security done in order to keep a license?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Are on-site reviews of security done in order to keep a license? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/19 (tie)

Design Basis Threat (DBT)

A Design Basis Threat that is based on strong assumptions and that is regularly updated leads to a more rigorous security system.

Assessment Question:

Do the country's regulations require the use of a Design Basis Threat that is required to be updated?

Answer:

No or information not publicly available (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do the country's regulations require the use of a Design Basis Threat that is required to be updated? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 16/19 (tie)

Tests and assessments

Tests and assessments of physical protection systems improves effectiveness of and identifies weaknesses in physical protection measures.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require evaluations of security systems’ effectiveness (including security personnel) that: a) include a requirement for evaluations that reflect realistic threat considerations? b) include a requirement to conduct regular force-on-force exercises using realistic scenarios?

Answer:

Yes, regulations require effectiveness evaluations that include one of these requirements (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes, regulations require effectiveness evaluations that include one of these requirements
2 Yes, regulations require effectiveness evaluations that include two of these requirements

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require evaluations of security systems’ effectiveness (including security personnel) that: a) include a requirement for evaluations that reflect realistic threat considerations? b) include a requirement to conduct regular force-on-force exercises using realistic scenarios? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes, regulations require effectiveness evaluations that include one of these requirements 2 = Yes, regulations require effectiveness evaluations that include two of these requirements

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 9/19 (tie)

Physical protection sustainability

NSSCs and other institutions that demonstrate core nuclear security competencies increase the sustainability of the nuclear security regime.

Assessment Question:

Does the country have a Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) or non-NSSC institutions that demonstrates core nuclear security sustainability competencies?

Answer:

A NSSC is operational and the member state participates in IAEA NSSC network (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No NSSC
1 A NSSC is operational OR the country has a non-NSSC institution that clearly demonstrates one of the competency areas required in the absence of a declared NSSC
2 A NSSC is operational and the member state participates in IAEA NSSC network

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country have a Nuclear Security Support Center (NSSC) or non-NSSC institutions that demonstrates core nuclear security sustainability competencies? 0 = No NSSC 1 = A NSSC is operational OR the country has a non-NSSC institution that clearly demonstrates one of the competency areas required in the absence of a declared NSSC 2 = A NSSC is operational and the member state participates in IAEA NSSC network

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Control and Accounting Procedures

Materials control and accounting is a necessary element of a comprehensive security system.

See Subindicators

90/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-10 where 10=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 6/22 Tie

Close

Legal and regulatory basis for MC&A

A legal and regulatory basis for control is part of the foundation of a strong system and culture of nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is there a domestic legal and regulatory basis for nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A)?

Answer:

There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A, international guidelines are reflected in the legal and regulatory system, and regulations include compliance enforcement requirements (3)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 There is no domestic legal or regulatory basis for MC&A or information not publicly available
1 There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A
2 There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A and international guidelines are reflected in the legal and regulatory system
3 There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A, international guidelines are reflected in the legal and regulatory system, and regulations include compliance enforcement requirements

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is there a domestic legal and regulatory basis for nuclear material control and accounting (MC&A)? 0 = There is no domestic legal or regulatory basis for MC&A or information not publicly available 1 = There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A 2 = There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A and international guidelines are reflected in the legal and regulatory system 3 = There is a legal and regulatory basis for MC&A, international guidelines are reflected in the legal and regulatory system, and regulations include compliance enforcement requirements

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Measurement methods

The quality of measurement methods corresponds to the ability to detect the diversion or theft of nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require measurement methods that provide accurate and precise qualification of nuclear materials?

Answer:

Yes, and regulations include a requirement for certification and calibration of measurement equipment using traceable and controlled standards (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes
2 Yes, and regulations include a requirement for certification and calibration of measurement equipment using traceable and controlled standards

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require measurement methods that provide accurate and precise qualification of nuclear materials? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and regulations include a requirement for certification and calibration of measurement equipment using traceable and controlled standards

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Inventory record

Maintaining complete, accurate, and timely records of the nuclear material inventory is necessary to detect the diversion or theft of nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require a complete, accurate, and timely record of the nuclear material inventory that is reported at defined intervals?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require a complete, accurate, and timely record of the nuclear material inventory that is reported at defined intervals? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Material balance area(s)

Well-defined and well-controlled geographical locations for nuclear materials enable more accurate accounting and increase the likelihood of detection of diversion or theft of nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that nuclear materials should be in well-defined and controlled geographical locations within the state?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes
2 Yes, and regulations include a requirement that each material balance area be overseen by a single custodian with an alternate custodian to provide coverage whenever the custodian is not available.

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that nuclear materials should be in well-defined and controlled geographical locations within the state? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and regulations include a requirement that each material balance area be overseen by a single custodian with an alternate custodian to provide coverage whenever the custodian is not available.

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 7/22 (tie)

Control measures

Control measures aid in the assurance that unauthorized access to restricted areas of nuclear facilities is detected in a timely manner.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require the following nuclear materials control measures? a). The identity of persons entering the protected area must be verified. b). Records must be kept of all persons who access inner areas and of all persons who have access to or possession of keys, keycards and/or other systems, including computer systems, that control access to inner areas.

Answer:

Regulations require two of these control measures (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Regulations do not require control measures, or information not publicly available
1 Regulations require one of these control measures
2 Regulations require two of these control measures

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require the following nuclear materials control measures? a). The identity of persons entering the protected area must be verified. b). Records must be kept of all persons who access inner areas and of all persons who have access to or possession of keys, keycards and/or other systems, including computer systems, that control access to inner areas. 0 = Regulations do not require control measures, or information not publicly available 1 = Regulations require one of these control measures 2 = Regulations require two of these control measures

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Insider Threat Prevention

The qualifications of personnel, the strength of the security culture, and the use of certain surveillance measures are critical to how well security procedures are followed and decrease vulnerability to insider threats.

See Subindicators

64/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-11 where 11=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 8/22 Tie

Close

Personnel vetting

Clear guidelines for the qualification and fitness of personnel increase the likelihood that security and other personnel with access to nuclear material areas will effectively discharge their responsibilities and decreases vulnerability to insider threats.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or license conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to nuclear material areas are subject to the following checks: drug testing; background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks?

Answer:

Personnel are subject to all three of these checks (3)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Personnel are not subject to any of these checks
1 Personnel are subject to one of these checks
2 Personnel are subject to two of these checks
3 Personnel are subject to all three of these checks

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or license conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to nuclear material areas are subject to the following checks: drug testing; background checks, and psychological or mental fitness checks? 0 = Personnel are not subject to any of these checks 1 = Personnel are subject to one of these checks 2 = Personnel are subject to two of these checks 3 = Personnel are subject to all three of these checks

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Frequency of personnel vetting

Personnel vetting at frequent intervals is essential to identifying new and changing insider threats.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to nuclear material areas are vetted at specified intervals?

Answer:

Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods greater than two (2), but not more than five (5) years (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Frequency of vetting is not specified or information not publicly available
1 Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods greater than five (5) years
2 Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods greater than two (2), but not more than five (5) years
3 Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods of two (2) years or less

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions specify that security and other personnel with access to nuclear material areas are vetted at specified intervals? 0 = Frequency of vetting is not specified or information not publicly available 1 = Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods greater than five (5) years 2 = Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods greater than two (2), but not more than five (5) years 3 = Such personnel are subject to vetting at periods of two (2) years or less

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 5/22 (tie)

Reporting

Requiring personnel to report suspicious behavior increases the likelihood that insider threats will be detected early.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions specify that personnel must report suspicious behavior to an official authority?

Answer:

No or information not publicly available (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions specify that personnel must report suspicious behavior to an official authority? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 14/22 (tie)

Surveillance

To counter the insider threat, whenever a protected area is occupied, constant surveillance (eg, a two-person surveillance system or technological surveillance system) should be used to achieve detection of unauthorized action.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require constant surveillance of inner areas when they are occupied using either a two-person surveillance system or a technological surveillance system?

Answer:

Yes, both a two-person surveillance system and a technological surveillance system are required (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes, a two-person surveillance system or a technological surveillance system is required
2 Yes, both a two-person surveillance system and a technological surveillance system are required

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require constant surveillance of inner areas when they are occupied using either a two-person surveillance system or a technological surveillance system? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes, a two-person surveillance system or a technological surveillance system is required 2 = Yes, both a two-person surveillance system and a technological surveillance system are required

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Insider threat awareness program

Insider threat awareness programs prepare nuclear workforces to pre-emptively identify internal threats to nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require a nuclear-specific insider threat awareness program for all personnel involved in the operation and management of nuclear facilities?

Answer:

No or information not publicly available (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes, a nuclear-specific insider threat awareness program is in place for all personnel involved in the operation and management of nuclear facilities
2 Yes, a nuclear-specific insider threat awareness program is in place for all personnel involved in the operation and management of nuclear facilities and it is regularly updated

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require a nuclear-specific insider threat awareness program for all personnel involved in the operation and management of nuclear facilities? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes, a nuclear-specific insider threat awareness program is in place for all personnel involved in the operation and management of nuclear facilities 2 = Yes, a nuclear-specific insider threat awareness program is in place for all personnel involved in the operation and management of nuclear facilities and it is regularly updated

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 9/22 (tie)

Physical Security During Transport

Materials in transit are particularly vulnerable to theft.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/22 Tie

Close

Physical security during transport

Materials in transport are particularly vulnerable to theft.

Assessment Question:

Are the IAEA guidelines regarding transport of nuclear materials encompassed in INFCIRC 225 Rev.5 translated into the national regulatory regime?

Answer:

Appropriate guidelines encompassed in INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 (based on quantities of materials in country) are met (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Appropriate guidelines encompassed in INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 (based on quantities of materials in country) are met

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Are the IAEA guidelines regarding transport of nuclear materials encompassed in INFCIRC 225 Rev.5 translated into the national regulatory regime? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Appropriate guidelines encompassed in INFCIRC 225/Rev. 5 (based on quantities of materials in country) are met

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Response Capabilities

Response capabilities are part of a layered security system and may enable materials to be recovered should they be stolen from a site.

See Subindicators

78/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-9 where 9=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 13/22 Tie

Close

Emergency response capabilities

Requiring on-site emergency response capabilities, including trained response teams and required incident reports (i.e., notification), increases the level of preparedness for potential nuclear sabotage incidents.

Assessment Question:

Do the state's licensing requirements for civilian nuclear facilities require that each facility have on-site nuclear security emergency response capabilities?

Answer:

Licensing requires both an on-site a trained response team and incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority (3)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Licensing does not require an on-site trained response team or incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority
1 Licensing requires incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority
2 Licensing requires an on-site trained response team
3 Licensing requires both an on-site a trained response team and incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do the state's licensing requirements for civilian nuclear facilities require that each facility have on-site nuclear security emergency response capabilities? 0 = Licensing does not require an on-site trained response team or incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority 1 = Licensing requires incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority 2 = Licensing requires an on-site trained response team 3 = Licensing requires both an on-site a trained response team and incident reports to appropriate law enforcement authority

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Armed response capabilities

Requiring on-site armed response capabilities increases the chance of success in responding to armed attacks.

Assessment Question:

Do the state’s licensing requirements for civilian nuclear facilities require that each facility with Category I quantities of nuclear material have an on-site armed response team?

Answer:

Yes, an on-site armed response team is required or the state does not have Category I quantities of nuclear material (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes, an on-site armed response team is required or the state does not have Category I quantities of nuclear material

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do the state’s licensing requirements for civilian nuclear facilities require that each facility with Category I quantities of nuclear material have an on-site armed response team? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes, an on-site armed response team is required or the state does not have Category I quantities of nuclear material

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Law enforcement response training

Law enforcement officers who are trained to respond to security incidents at nuclear facilities have a greater chance of success responding to those incidents than those who are untrained.

Assessment Question:

Are law enforcement trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility?

Answer:

Yes, law enforcement are trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No, law enforcement are not trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility
1 Yes, law enforcement are trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Are law enforcement trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility? 0 = No, law enforcement are not trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility 1 = Yes, law enforcement are trained to respond in the event of a security incident at a nuclear facility

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Nuclear infrastructure protection plan

Including this sub-indicator shows a country’s level of preparedness to protect nuclear infrastructure during emergencies, including both natural and man-made disasters. Including this in the index helps assess whether countries have comprehensive and tested plans to prevent the loss, damage or theft of nuclear materials during crisis that could undermine nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Does the country's regulatory framework state that, in the event of a man-made or natural disaster, plans are in place to physically protect the nuclear infrastructure?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes
2 Yes and tests of the nuclear infrastructure protection plan are required at defined intervals

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country's regulatory framework state that, in the event of a man-made or natural disaster, plans are in place to physically protect the nuclear infrastructure? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes 2 = Yes and tests of the nuclear infrastructure protection plan are required at defined intervals

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 11/22 (tie)

Response coordination capabilities

Joint on- and off-site exercises ensure local response forces are properly integrated into facility security.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that on-site and off-site emergency response teams conduct joint exercises?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes
2 Yes, and regulations require joint exercises to be conducted at least annually

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that on-site and off-site emergency response teams conduct joint exercises? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and regulations require joint exercises to be conducted at least annually

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 12/22 (tie)

Cybersecurity

Nuclear materials and facilities are vulnerable to cyber attacks as well as physical attacks. Therefore, cybersecurity is a critical component of protecting against theft.

See Subindicators

42/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-12 where 12=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 15/22 Tie

Close

Mandatory cybersecurity

Requiring nuclear facilities to have protection from a cyber attack increases the likelihood that nuclear facilities will take measures to protect against cyber attacks.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect against cyber attacks?

Answer:

Yes, domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect against cyber attacks (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes, domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect against cyber attacks
2 Yes and a voluntary review program exists to review cybersecurity during the construction phase or prior to formal licensing
3 Yes and domestic regulations or licensing requirements require the establishment of a cybersecurity program at the construction stage in addition to at operation

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect against cyber attacks? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes, domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect against cyber attacks 2 = Yes and a voluntary review program exists to review cybersecurity during the construction phase or prior to formal licensing 3 = Yes and domestic regulations or licensing requirements require the establishment of a cybersecurity program at the construction stage in addition to at operation

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 5/22 (tie)

Sensitive digital asset management

Requiring protection of sensitive digital assets against cyber attacks decreases the chance that an attacker can circumvent the most critical systems, information, and processes within the facility to protect against sabotage.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect sensitive digital assets that impact safety, security, emergency preparedness functions, and their support systems from a cyber attack?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes
2 Yes, and sensitive digital assets are required to be routinely or periodically catalogued
3 Yes, and regulations are now using a function-based approach to managing sensitive digital assets

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require nuclear facilities to protect sensitive digital assets that impact safety, security, emergency preparedness functions, and their support systems from a cyber attack? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and sensitive digital assets are required to be routinely or periodically catalogued 3 = Yes, and regulations are now using a function-based approach to managing sensitive digital assets

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 12/22 (tie)

Cybersecurity DBT

Requiring that the Design Basis Threat take into account the potential for cyber attacks to create security risks at a nuclear facility increases the likelihood that nuclear facilities will consider cyberattacks when designing their security plans.

Assessment Question:

Does the state consider cyber threats in its threat assessment or Design Basis Threat (DBT) for nuclear facilities?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the state consider cyber threats in its threat assessment or Design Basis Threat (DBT) for nuclear facilities? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Cybersecurity assessments

Required demonstration of performance, along with tests and assessments, improves effectiveness of and identifies weaknesses in cybersecurity measures.

Assessment Question:

Does the regulator require tests and assessments of cybersecurity at nuclear facilities?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes
2 Yes, and tests and assessments are conducted at least annually

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the regulator require tests and assessments of cybersecurity at nuclear facilities? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and tests and assessments are conducted at least annually

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 8/22 (tie)

Cybersecurity capacity building

Assessing whether a country’s nuclear regulator is proactively strengthening defenses against cyber threats by investing in planning and institutional capacity is essential for ensuring the resilience of digital systems that protect nuclear materials and facilities.

Assessment Question:

Is the country’s regulator bolstering its cybersecurity technical capacity through strategic planning and dedicated technical institutions?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country’s regulator bolstering its cybersecurity technical capacity through strategic planning and dedicated technical institutions? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes Countries receive credit for a national nuclear regulator cybersecurity roadmap/strategy and/or Technical Support Organisations (TSOs) conducting active work on cybersecurity.

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Cyber incident response plan

Requiring an incident response plan (a plan of action to respond) for a cyber security incident or attack at nuclear facilities helps to limit damage and reduce recovery times.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require a cyber-incident response plan for nuclear facilities?

Answer:

No or information not publicly available (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require a cyber-incident response plan for nuclear facilities? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 14/22 (tie)

Mandatory cybersecurity awareness program

Requiring a cybersecurity awareness program increases the likelihood that all employees with access to computer networks understand basic cybersecurity protocols and practices.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that licensees or operators have a cybersecurity awareness program that reaches all personnel with access to digital systems?

Answer:

No or information not publicly available (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that licensees or operators have a cybersecurity awareness program that reaches all personnel with access to digital systems? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 10/22 (tie)

Security Culture

Effective security culture ensures organizations remain committed to following through on security requirements and responsibilities at all levels of the organizational structure.

See Subindicators

50/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-6 where 6=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 8/22 Tie

Close

Security culture

An organization with a strong security culture has staff who are committed to security, strive for excellence, and look for ways to make their security systems stronger. Steps to promote a strong security culture, as distinct from safety culture, help nuclear facilities and organizations retain a strong commitment to security procedures and practices at all levels of the organizational structure.

Assessment Question:

Does the state's nuclear security regulator reference "security culture" in its annual report(s) and/or in its regulations?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the state's nuclear security regulator reference "security culture" in its annual report(s) and/or in its regulations? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Security culture assessments

Assessments of security culture help institutions continuously assess and improve their nuclear security culture.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that licensees or operators conduct security culture assessments?

Answer:

No or information not publicly available (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that licensees or operators conduct security culture assessments? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 6/22 (tie)

Security responsibilities and accountabilities

Requiring licensees to hold particular individuals accountable for security increases the likelihood that physical protection measures will be implemented.

Assessment Question:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security and that such individual[s] undergoes additional training and/or certification?

Answer:

Yes, regulations require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or information not publicly available
1 Yes, regulations require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security
2 Yes, regulations require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security and require that such individual[s] undergoes additional training and/or certification

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Do domestic regulations or licensing conditions require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security and that such individual[s] undergoes additional training and/or certification? 0 = No or information not publicly available 1 = Yes, regulations require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security 2 = Yes, regulations require that licensees or operators define an individual[s] responsible for at least one aspect of nuclear security and require that such individual[s] undergoes additional training and/or certification

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 8/22 (tie)

Nuclear security participation enabling environment

Incorporating principles of equality, openness and participation into nuclear security practices can lead to more robust organizational cultures that prioritize security and accountability.

Assessment Question:

Does the country have a policy to support equal participation or reduce discrimination in the nuclear workforce, or has it made any official public statements supporting equal participation or reduction of discrimination in nuclear security?

Answer:

The country has made statements on equal participation but these are not tantamount to a policy (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 The country does not have a policy to enable equal participation in nuclear security
1 The country has made statements on equal participation but these are not tantamount to a policy
2 The country has a policy to enable full participation in nuclear security

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country have a policy to support equal participation or reduce discrimination in the nuclear workforce, or has it made any official public statements supporting equal participation or reduction of discrimination in nuclear security? 0 = The country does not have a policy to enable equal participation in nuclear security 1 = The country has made statements on equal participation but these are not tantamount to a policy 2 = The country has a policy to enable full participation in nuclear security

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 8/22 (tie)

GLOBAL NORMS

The Global Norms category includes actions that contribute to the establishment of global norms for nuclear materials security. It includes important international legal commitments, voluntary participation in a number of global initiatives, international assurances, and nuclear security INFCIRCs.

42/100 -9 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 20/22

International Legal Commitments

International legal commitments are the basis for domestic legislation, regulations, and security capacity.

See Subindicators

63/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 17/22 Tie

Close

Physical Protection Convention (CPPNM)

Parties to the CPPNM commit to provide certain levels of physical protection during international transport of nuclear materials; cooperate in the protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material; and criminalize offenses involving nuclear material.

Assessment Question:

Is the state a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Non-compliant or not a party
1 Signed
2 Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the state a party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)? 0 = Non-compliant or not a party 1 = Signed 2 = Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/22 (tie)

2005 Amendment to the CPPNM

Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the CPPNM commit to expand the scope of their responsibilities under the CPPNM to include protection of nuclear material in domestic use, in storage, and during transport, as well as protection of nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

Is the state a party to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Ratified, accepted or approved (or action having the same legal effect) (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Not ratified, accepted or approved
1 Ratified, accepted or approved (or action having the same legal effect)

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the state a party to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)? 0 = Not ratified, accepted or approved 1 = Ratified, accepted or approved (or action having the same legal effect)

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Nuclear Terrorism Convention (ICSANT)

Parties to the ICSANT commit to criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and promote cooperation with other states to prevent, investigate, and punish those acts.

Assessment Question:

Is the state a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)?

Answer:

Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect) (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Non-compliant or not a party
1 Signed
2 Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the state a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT)? 0 = Non-compliant or not a party 1 = Signed 2 = Signed and ratified (or action having the same legal effect)

Source:

United Nations

Rank 1/22 (tie)

IAEA safeguards agreement

Conclusion of a safeguards agreement demonstrates a state's commitment to its stewardship of nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

Has the state concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement?

Answer:

No or a Small Quantities Protocol or otherwise incomplete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No or a Small Quantities Protocol or otherwise incomplete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities
1 Yes, a Modified Small Quantities Protocol, an INFCIRC 153, or complete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities under an equivalent arrangement
2 Yes, the Additional Protocol

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state concluded an IAEA safeguards agreement? 0 = No or a Small Quantities Protocol or otherwise incomplete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities 1 = Yes, a Modified Small Quantities Protocol, an INFCIRC 153, or complete coverage of peaceful nuclear facilities under an equivalent arrangement 2 = Yes, the Additional Protocol Countries with nuclear weapons only receive full credit if they have a voluntary offer agreement with the IAEA that explicitly make all civilian nuclear facilities subject to IAEA safeguards.

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 16/22 (tie)

Additional Protocol of Geneva Convention

Inclusion of adherence to Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (INFCIRC/335) as a measure in a Nuclear Security Index strengthens the assessment of a state’s commitment to preventing the use of nuclear facilities as instruments of warfare. Article 56 explicitly prohibits attacks on nuclear power plants and other installations containing dangerous forces, thereby reinforcing international norms that protect civilians and the environment from catastrophic harm during armed conflict. Tracking states’ ratification, accession, or withdrawal provides a clear, verifiable indicator of legal and ethical alignment with global standards for the protection of nuclear infrastructure and humanitarian principles.

Assessment Question:

Has the country ratified the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I)?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country ratified the additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I)? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Committee of the Red Cross

Rank 17/22 (tie)

Voluntary Commitments

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for nuclear materials security.

See Subindicators

67/100 -33 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-6 where 6=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 18/22 Tie

Close

Global FTPRNT

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is the country/area a member of the Global FTPRNT?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country/area a member of the Global FTPRNT? 0 = No 1 = Yes This sub-indicator captured GICNT membership until 2023. It has been updated in 2026 as Global FTPRNT has since replaced GICNT membership.

Source:

Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism

Rank 15/22 (tie)

Global Partnership membership

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is the country/area a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country/area a member of the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

U.S. Department of State

Rank 14/22 (tie)

WINS contributions

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) within the previous three years?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS) within the previous three years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

World Institute for Nuclear Security Annual Report 2013 and 2014

Rank 5/22 (tie)

IAEA Nuclear Security Fund contributions

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund within the previous two years?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country provided financial or in-kind contributions to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund within the previous two years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 15/22 (tie)

Bilateral/multilateral financial and in-kind assistance

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country/area provided financial and/or in-kind bilateral or multilateral assistance for other states or received such assistance in the field of nuclear security (exclusive of contributions captured elsewhere in this indicator) within the previous two years?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country/area provided financial and/or in-kind bilateral or multilateral assistance for other states or received such assistance in the field of nuclear security (exclusive of contributions captured elsewhere in this indicator) within the previous two years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 10/22 (tie)

Ministerial participation in ICONS

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Did the country participate in the latest International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) at the ministerial level?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Did the country participate in the latest International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) at the ministerial level? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 16/22 (tie)

Incident and Trafficking Database

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Does the country participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country participate in the IAEA Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB)? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) mission

EPREV missions help countries keep up to date protocols for nuclear security emergency preparedness and response.

Assessment Question:

Has the country hosted an Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) mission?

Answer:

Yes, but not in the last 2 years. (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes, but not in the last 2 years.
2 Yes, in the last two years

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country hosted an Emergency Preparedness Review Service (EPREV) mission? 0 = No 1 = Yes, but not in the last 2 years. 2 = Yes, in the last two years

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/22 (tie)

ConvEx-3 and other field exercise participation

Participation in ConvEx-3 exercises and other field exercises boost countries' preparedness to address emergency scenarios as it relates to nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the country participated in the most recent ConvEx-3 exercise or another relevant nuclear security field exercise in the last 5 years?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country participated in the most recent ConvEx-3 exercise or another relevant nuclear security field exercise in the last 5 years? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Nuclear Security Guidance Committee

Voluntary commitments demonstrate a state's support for global efforts to strengthen nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Does the country/area participate in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country/area participate in the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance Committee? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 1/22 (tie)

International Assurances

International assurances enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of a country/area’s nuclear security.

See Subindicators

25/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-24 where 24=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 17/22 Tie

Close

Published regulations

Public release of nuclear security regulations increases confidence in a country/area's commitment to nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Does the state publicly release its nuclear security regulations?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the state publicly release its nuclear security regulations? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Published nuclear security annual reports

Public release of annual reports regarding nuclear security helps build international confidence.

Assessment Question:

Does the state publicly release annual reports on nuclear security issues?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes, the country/state has published at least one report on nuclear security
2 Yes, the country/state has published two or more consecutive annual reports on nuclear security

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the state publicly release annual reports on nuclear security issues? 0 = No 1 = Yes, the country/state has published at least one report on nuclear security 2 = Yes, the country/state has published two or more consecutive annual reports on nuclear security

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 13/22 (tie)

Published nuclear security progress reports

Public declarations about nuclear security progress promotes improvement, builds international confidence, and increases public accountability

Assessment Question:

Has the state made public declarations about nuclear security progress?

Answer:

Yes, the state has made public declarations on nuclear security progress (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes, the state has made public declarations on nuclear security progress
2 Yes, the state has made public declarations on nuclear security progress within the past 2 years

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state made public declarations about nuclear security progress? 0 = No 1 = Yes, the state has made public declarations on nuclear security progress 2 = Yes, the state has made public declarations on nuclear security progress within the past 2 years

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 18/22 (tie)

Public declarations/reports about civilian nuclear materials

Public declarations or reports about nuclear material help build international confidence.

Assessment Question:

Does the country/state make any public declarations or reports about quantities of nuclear materials used for civilian purposes?

Answer:

Yes, the country/state makes public declarations or reports about quantities of HEU OR separated plutonium for civilian purposes at defined intervals (i.e., on an annual basis) (3)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No, the country/state has not made any public declarations or reports about quantities of nuclear materials used for civilian purposes
1 Yes, the country/state has made at least one public declaration or report about quantities of HEU or separated plutonium for civilian purposes
2 Yes, the country/state has made at least one public declaration or report about quantities of HEU and separated plutonium for civilian purposes
3 Yes, the country/state makes public declarations or reports about quantities of HEU OR separated plutonium for civilian purposes at defined intervals (i.e., on an annual basis)
4 Yes, the country/state makes public declarations or reports about quantities of HEU AND separated plutonium for civilian purposes at defined intervals (i.e., on an annual basis)

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the country/state make any public declarations or reports about quantities of nuclear materials used for civilian purposes? 0 = No, the country/state has not made any public declarations or reports about quantities of nuclear materials used for civilian purposes 1 = Yes, the country/state has made at least one public declaration or report about quantities of HEU or separated plutonium for civilian purposes 2 = Yes, the country/state has made at least one public declaration or report about quantities of HEU and separated plutonium for civilian purposes 3 = Yes, the country/state makes public declarations or reports about quantities of HEU OR separated plutonium for civilian purposes at defined intervals (i.e., on an annual basis) 4 = Yes, the country/state makes public declarations or reports about quantities of HEU AND separated plutonium for civilian purposes at defined intervals (i.e., on an annual basis)

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 5/22 (tie)

Public declarations/reports about military nuclear materials

Public declarations or reports about nuclear material help build international confidence.

Assessment Question:

Does the state make any public declarations or reports about nuclear materials used for military purposes?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes
2 Yes, and the most recent report has been released since January 1, 2020

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the state make any public declarations or reports about nuclear materials used for military purposes? 0 = No 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and the most recent report has been released since January 1, 2020

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 16/22 (tie)

Review of security arrangements

Hosting security reviews demonstrates the importance a country/area places on its security obligations and creates international confidence in levels of security.

Assessment Question:

Has the state hosted an IAEA review or a bilateral/multilateral review of its security arrangements (excluding IPPAS missions)?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes
2 Yes, within the past five years

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state hosted an IAEA review or a bilateral/multilateral review of its security arrangements (excluding IPPAS missions)? 0 = No 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, within the past five years

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 8/22 (tie)

IPPAS mission

IPPAS missions help countries/areas identify areas for improvement in physical protection systems.

Assessment Question:

Has the state hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission (including follow-up missions)?

Answer:

No, the state has never hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission AND has not demonstrated a desire/intent to host a mission. (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No, the state has never hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission AND has not demonstrated a desire/intent to host a mission.
1 No, the state has not hosted a mission, but the state has demonstrated its desire or intent to host a mission by:
2 Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission
3 Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission, and it was within the last five years
4 Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission within the last five years AND the state has publicly released a summary of the results
5 Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission within the last five years AND the state has publicly released a full report of the results

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission (including follow-up missions)? 0 = No, the state has never hosted an International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) mission AND has not demonstrated a desire/intent to host a mission. 1 = No, the state has not hosted a mission, but the state has demonstrated its desire or intent to host a mission by: a) Making a public request for an IPPAS mission, b) Holding a workshop in anticipation of an IPPAS mission, or c) Scheduling an IPPAS mission. 2 = Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission 3 = Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission, and it was within the last five years 4 = Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission within the last five years AND the state has publicly released a summary of the results 5 = Yes, the state has hosted an IPPAS mission within the last five years AND the state has publicly released a full report of the results

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 18/22 (tie)

Endorsement of IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars

An endorsement of the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars signals a country's commitment to nuclear safety and security standards.

Assessment Question:

Has the country published any endorsement of the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country published any endorsement of the IAEA's Seven Indispensable Pillars for Ensuring Nuclear Safety and Security During an Armed Conflict? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 14/22 (tie)

Commitment to develop capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel

Commitments to developing capacity and sites for the irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel are crucial for preventing future risks of radiation release from damage to spent fuel storage and minimizing access to potential weapons-usable nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

Has the country committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel?

Answer:

Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and the country has identified a site (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No, the country has not committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel
1 Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and the country has identified a site
2 Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and the country is in the licensing process
3 Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and licensing is completed

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel? 0 = No, the country has not committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel 1 = Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and the country has identified a site 2 = Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and the country is in the licensing process 3 = Yes, the country has committed to developing capacity/sites for irretrievable permanent storage of spent nuclear fuel and licensing is completed

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 4/22 (tie)

Commitment to forgo reprocessing of nuclear fuel

A commitment to forgo reprocessing of nuclear fuel reflects a country's dedication to minimizing nuclear security and proliferation risks by avoiding technologies that can directly result in weapons-usable nuclear material..

Assessment Question:

Has the country committed to forgo reprocessing of nuclear fuel?

Answer:

The country has not committed to forgo reprocessing and the country currently has reprocessing facilities (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 The country has not committed to forgo reprocessing and the country currently has reprocessing facilities
1 The country has not committed to forgo reprocessing, but the country does not currently have reprocessing facilities OR the country has committed to forgo reprocessing, but the country has not yet stopped reprocessing activities
2 The country has committed to forgo reprocessing and the country has stopped reprocessing or has never engaged in reprocessing

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the country committed to forgo reprocessing of nuclear fuel? 0 = The country has not committed to forgo reprocessing and the country currently has reprocessing facilities 1 = The country has not committed to forgo reprocessing, but the country does not currently have reprocessing facilities OR the country has committed to forgo reprocessing, but the country has not yet stopped reprocessing activities 2 = The country has committed to forgo reprocessing and the country has stopped reprocessing or has never engaged in reprocessing

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 15/22 (tie)

Nuclear Security INFCIRCs

Countries/areas that have subscribed to nuclear security IAEA Information Circulars (INFCIRCs) demonstrate a commitment to international best practices in nuclear security.

See Subindicators

0/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 18/22 Tie

Close

INFCIRC/869

Subscribing states commit to strengthening their national nuclear security regimes and ensuring continuous improvement.

Assessment Question:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/869?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/869? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 17/22 (tie)

INFCIRC/908

Subscribing states commit to establishing and implementing national-level measures to mitigate insider threat.

Assessment Question:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/908?

Answer:

No (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state subscribed to INFCIRC/908? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 15/22 (tie)

Other nuclear security INFCIRCs

Subscribing states commit to strengthening their national nuclear security regimes and supporting global norms.

Assessment Question:

Has the state subscribed to the following INFCIRCs: 899, 901, 904, 905, 909, 912, 917 and 918?

Answer:

No, the state has not subscribed to any of these INFCIRCs (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No, the state has not subscribed to any of these INFCIRCs
1 Yes, the state has subscribed to one of these INFCIRCs
2 Yes, the state has subscribed to two of these INFCIRCs
3 Yes, the state has subscribed to three or more of these INFCIRCs

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state subscribed to the following INFCIRCs: 899, 901, 904, 905, 909, 912, 917 and 918? 0 = No, the state has not subscribed to any of these INFCIRCs 1 = Yes, the state has subscribed to one of these INFCIRCs 2 = Yes, the state has subscribed to two of these INFCIRCs 3 = Yes, the state has subscribed to three or more of these INFCIRCs

Source:

International Atomic Energy Agency

Rank 18/22 (tie)

DOMESTIC COMMITMENTS AND CAPACITY

The Domestic Commitments and Capacity category includes actions that indicate how well a country/area has implemented its international commitments and a country/area’s capacity to do so. This category includes the extent of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 implementation, the status of legislation to implement the CPPNM Amendment, and the presence of an independent regulatory agency.

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 1/22 Tie

UNSCR 1540 Implementation

UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 obliges action on nuclear materials security and its implementation demonstrates a state's commitment level.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/22 Tie

Close

UNSCR 1540 reporting

Compliance with UNSCR 1540 reporting requirements demonstrates commitment to UNSCR 1540's security objectives.

Assessment Question:

Has the state provided the required UNSCR 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)?

Answer:

The state has produced a 1540 report (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 The state has not produced a 1540 report
1 The state has produced a 1540 report

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state provided the required UNSCR 1540 report to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)? 0 = The state has not produced a 1540 report 1 = The state has produced a 1540 report

Source:

Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (1540 Committee)

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Extent of UNSCR 1540 implementation

Implementation of UNSCR 1540 demonstrates commitment to UNSCR 1540's security objectives and improves security procedures and culture.

Assessment Question:

Extent of implementation is identified through the measures taken by a state and reflected in its UNSCR 1540 matrix.

Answer:

Very good (100+ points) (4)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very weak (0-24 points)
1 Weak (25-49 points) or matrix exists, but is not publicly available
2 Moderate (50-74 points)
3 Good (75-99 points)
4 Very good (100+ points)

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Extent of implementation is identified through the measures taken by a state and reflected in its UNSCR 1540 matrix. 0 = Very weak (0-24 points) 1 = Weak (25-49 points) or matrix exists, but is not publicly available 2 = Moderate (50-74 points) 3 = Good (75-99 points) 4 = Very good (100+ points)

Source:

Creation of a coding and scoring scheme by the Economist Enterprise, based on documents from the UN 1540 Committee

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Domestic Nuclear Security Legislation

The implementation of security measures is rooted in domestic nuclear security legislation.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-3 where 3=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/22 Tie

Close

CPPNM implementation authority

Existence of a national authority (state body) to implement the CPPNM increases the likelihood of implementation and demonstrates commitment to the CPPNM's objectives.

Assessment Question:

Is there a national authority for the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is there a national authority for the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM)? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

National legal framework for CPPNM Amendment

Updating a country/area's national legal framework to reflect obligations under the CPPNM Amendment is necessary to achieve implementation of the convention and is part of the foundation of a strong system and culture of nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Has the state fulfilled all obligations for a national legal framework for the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)?

Answer:

Yes, and the country has submitted information to the IAEA as required by Article 14.1 (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes
2 Yes, and the country has submitted information to the IAEA as required by Article 14.1

Scored 0-2 where 2=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Has the state fulfilled all obligations for a national legal framework for the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)? 0 = No 1 = Yes 2 = Yes, and the country has submitted information to the IAEA as required by Article 14.1

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Independent Regulatory Agency

A robust and independent regulatory structure helps to ensure compliance with nuclear security-related regulations.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/22 Tie

Close

Independent regulatory agency

A robust and independent regulatory structure helps to ensure compliance with nuclear security-related regulations.

Assessment Question:

Does the state have an independent regulatory agency responsible for regulating security?

Answer:

Yes (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 No
1 Yes

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Does the state have an independent regulatory agency responsible for regulating security? 0 = No 1 = Yes

Source:

Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment based on official national sources, which vary by country/area.

Rank 1/22 (tie)

RISK ENVIRONMENT

The Risk Environment can affect the nuclear security conditions in a country/area. Factors include political stability, effective governance, pervasiveness of corruption, illicit activities of non-state actors, and environmental risk.

30/100 -4 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-100 where 100=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Rank 20/22

Political Stability

A lack of political stability may enable lapses in nuclear security.

See Subindicators

13/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-15 where 15=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 21/22 Tie

Close

Stability

Significant instability can affect the government's ability to secure nuclear facilities or the upheaval created by instability may provide opportunities for groups seeking to illicitly acquire nuclear materials.

Assessment Question:

How stable is the country?

Answer:

Low stability (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very low stability
1 Low stability
2 Moderate stability
3 High stability
4 Very high stability

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How stable is the country? 0 = Very low stability 1 = Low stability 2 = Moderate stability 3 = High stability 4 = Very high stability

Source:

Fragile States Index

Rank 19/22 (tie)

Orderly transfers of power

Instability and conflict surrounding changes of power may provide opportunities for groups seeking to commit acts of sabotage against nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?

Answer:

Not clear, established or accepted (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Not clear, established or accepted
1 Two of the three criteria are absent
2 One of the three criteria is absent
3 Clear, established, and accepted
4 Very clear, established, and accepted

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How clear, established, and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another? 0 = Not clear, established or accepted 1 = Two of the three criteria are absent 2 = One of the three criteria is absent 3 = Clear, established, and accepted 4 = Very clear, established, and accepted Unclear, poorly established, or weakly accepted constitutional mechanisms for the transfer of power are a particular concern for succession in autocracies, but can also prove an issue in more democratic systems, for example, if election results are not accepted by all sides.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 17/22 (tie)

International disputes/tensions

Tensions with important trade or strategic partners and armed regional conflicts could have destabilizing implications for a country and, hence, for nuclear security.

Assessment Question:

Is the country currently involved, directly or indirectly, in an armed conflict or dispute?

Answer:

limited wars (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 war
1 limited wars
2 violent crises
3 non-violent crises
4 disputes
5 no conflict or involvement

Scored 0-5 where 5=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is the country currently involved, directly or indirectly, in an armed conflict or dispute? 0 = war 1 = limited wars 2 = violent crises 3 = non-violent crises 4 = disputes 5 = no conflict or involvement

Source:

Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research

Rank 19/22 (tie)

Armed conflict

Armed conflict in areas where nuclear facilities are located could disrupt nuclear security implementation or result in direct damage to the physical infrastructure of nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

To what extent are nuclear materials/facilities at risk due to armed conflict?

Answer:

A battle/explosion/armed conflict clash has occurred within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 A battle/explosion/armed conflict clash has occurred within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months
1 No conflict has taken place within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

To what extent are nuclear materials/facilities at risk due to armed conflict? 0 = A battle/explosion/armed conflict clash has occurred within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months 1 = No conflict has taken place within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months

Source:

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED); Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 15/22 (tie)

Violent demonstrations or violent civil/labor unrest

Violent demonstrations that require police and security attention in areas where nuclear facilities are located could seriously compromise site security and the availability of resources.

Assessment Question:

To what extent are nuclear materials/facilities at risk due to violent demonstrations?

Answer:

A violent demonstration/riot conflict clash has occurred within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 A violent demonstration/riot conflict clash has occurred within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months
1 No violent demonstration/riot has taken place within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 month

Scored 0-1 where 1=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

To what extent are nuclear materials/facilities at risk due to violent demonstrations? 0 = A violent demonstration/riot conflict clash has occurred within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 months 1 = No violent demonstration/riot has taken place within 10 miles of a nuclear facility in the past 12 month

Source:

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED); Economist Enterprise analyst qualitative assessment

Rank 12/22 (tie)

Effective Governance

A lack of effective governance can compromise a country/area’s ability to establish and sustain policies to secure nuclear facilities.

See Subindicators

13/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 18/22 Tie

Close

Effectiveness of the political system

An ineffective political system can compromise a country/area’s ability to establish and sustain policies to secure nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

How effective is the country’s political system in formulating and executing policy?

Answer:

Very low (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very low
1 Low
2 Moderate
3 High
4 Very high

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How effective is the country’s political system in formulating and executing policy? 0 = Very low 1 = Low 2 = Moderate 3 = High 4 = Very high This sub-indicator assesses tensions between the legislative and executive branches of government; instability in government formation; and cohesion of the legislature.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 18/22 (tie)

Quality of the bureaucracy

An ineffective bureaucracy can compromise a country/area’s ability to establish and sustain policies to secure nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

What is the quality of the country’s bureaucracy and its ability to carry out government policy?

Answer:

Low (1)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very low
1 Low
2 Moderate
3 High
4 Very high

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

What is the quality of the country’s bureaucracy and its ability to carry out government policy? 0 = Very low 1 = Low 2 = Moderate 3 = High 4 = Very high This sub-indicator assesses the quality of the bureaucracy across the following criteria: overall competency/training; morale/dedication; and compensation/status.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 17/22 (tie)

Pervasiveness of Corruption

Corruption affects the potential for theft of nuclear materials and the rigor with which nuclear security measures are implemented.

See Subindicators

0/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-8 where 8=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 19/22 Tie

Close

Pervasiveness of corruption

Corruption affects the potential for theft of nuclear materials and the rigor with which nuclear security measures are implemented.

Assessment Question:

How pervasive is corruption among public officials?

Answer:

Very high (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very high
1 High
2 Moderate
3 Low
4 Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How pervasive is corruption among public officials? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low The following factors are considered in this assessment: length that the regime or government has been in power; number of officials appointed rather than elected; frequency of reports or rumors of bribery; and perception of the degree to which public officials are involved in corrupt practices (eg, misuse of public office for private benefit, accepting bribes, dispensing favors and patronage for private gain).

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 19/22 (tie)

Vested interests/cronyism

Vested cronyism can affect the rigor with which nuclear security measures are implemented.

Assessment Question:

How pervasive is vested interests/cronyism among public officials?

Answer:

Very high (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very high
1 High
2 Moderate
3 Low
4 Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How pervasive is vested interests/cronyism among public officials? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 17/22 (tie)

Illicit Activities by Non-State Actors

The presence and capabilities of terrorist groups and prevalence of other illicit activities raises the risk of theft of nuclear materials.

See Subindicators

54/100 -14 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-28 where 28=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 18/22

Close

Likelihood of terrorist attacks

The overall threat of terrorism provides context for the security threat posed by non-state groups.

Assessment Question:

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption to business operations?

Answer:

Moderate (2)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very high
1 High
2 Moderate
3 Low
4 Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How likely is it that domestic or foreign terrorists will attack with a frequency or severity that causes substantial disruption to business operations? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low This sub-indicator assesses the risk of a destabilizing terrorist attack, and therefore takes into account the country/area's current security outlook, political and economic stability, and resilience to such attacks.

Source:

EIU Operational Risk

Rank 12/22 (tie)

Firearms seized during interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking

The availability of illicit arms impacts the ability of non-state groups to commit armed attacks.

Assessment Question:

How many firearms have been seized by law enforcement over the past 5 years?

Answer:

Very high (0)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very high
1 High
2 Moderate
3 Low
4 Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How many firearms have been seized by law enforcement over the past 5 years? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low This sub-indicator assesses the number of weapons seized during interdiction of illicit weapons trafficking, as reported to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. These values are then distributed into quintiles, with 0 representing the highest quintile of weapon seizures and 4 representing the lowest.

Source:

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Rank 14/22 (tie)

Domestic terrorism threat

The domestic presence of terrorist activity increases the risk of nuclear terrorism, including the potential seizure of nuclear materials or attacks on nuclear facilities.

Assessment Question:

Is there a significant domestic terrorism threat, as measured by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), that could increase the risk of nuclear materials theft or sabotage of a nuclear facility?

Answer:

Moderately high domestic terrorism threat (4)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Extreme domestic terrorism threat
1 Severe domestic terrorism threat
2 Very high domestic terrorism threat
3 High domestic terrorism threat
4 Moderately high domestic terrorism threat
5 Moderate domestic terrorism threat
6 Moderately low domestic terrorism threat
7 Low domestic terrorism threat
8 Very low domestic terrorism threat
9 Minimal domestic terrorism threat
10 Negligible domestic terrorism threat

Scored 0-10 where 10=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

Is there a significant domestic terrorism threat, as measured by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), that could increase the risk of nuclear materials theft or sabotage of a nuclear facility? 0 = Extreme domestic terrorism threat 1 = Severe domestic terrorism threat 2 = Very high domestic terrorism threat 3 = High domestic terrorism threat 4 = Moderately high domestic terrorism threat 5 = Moderate domestic terrorism threat 6 = Moderately low domestic terrorism threat 7 = Low domestic terrorism threat 8 = Very low domestic terrorism threat 9 = Minimal domestic terrorism threat 10 = Negligible domestic terrorism threat

Source:

Global Terrorism Index (GTI)

Rank 19/22 (tie)

Neighboring terror threat

The presence of terrorist activity in neighboring countries/areas may undermine the security of domestic nuclear materials and facilities through regional instability, cross-border militant activity, and illicit trafficking networks.

Assessment Question:

How high is the risk that terrorist activity in neighboring countries/areas could increase the risk of nuclear materials theft or sabotage?

Answer:

Minimal neighboring terror threat (9)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Extreme neighboring terror threat
1 Severe neighboring terror threat
2 Very high neighboring terror threat
3 High neighboring terror threat
4 Moderately high neighboring terror threat
5 Moderate neighboring terror threat
6 Moderately low neighboring terror threat
7 Low neighboring terror threat
8 Very low neighboring terror threat
9 Minimal neighboring terror threat
10 Negligible neighboring terror threat

Scored 0-10 where 10=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

How high is the risk that terrorist activity in neighboring countries/areas could increase the risk of nuclear materials theft or sabotage? 0 = Extreme neighboring terror threat 1 = Severe neighboring terror threat 2 = Very high neighboring terror threat 3 = High neighboring terror threat 4 = Moderately high neighboring terror threat 5 = Moderate neighboring terror threat 6 = Moderately low neighboring terror threat 7 = Low neighboring terror threat 8 = Very low neighboring terror threat 9 = Minimal neighboring terror threat 10 = Negligible neighboring terror threat

Source:

Global Terrorism Index (GTI)

Rank 1/22 (tie)

Environmental Risk

Climate change and environmental impacts like flooding and extreme heat can threaten the integrity and security of nuclear infrastructure facilities.

See Subindicators

100/100 0 Score Change from 2023

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions. This score is then adjusted to the range 0-100.

Rank 1/22 Tie

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Environmental vulnerability

Climate change and environmental impacts like flooding and extreme heat can threaten the integrity and security of nuclear infrastructure facilities.

Assessment Question:

What is the level of risk to physical infrastructure as a result of climate impacts?

Answer:

Very low (4)

Raw Indicator Score Answer Choices
0 Very high
1 High
2 Moderate
3 Low
4 Very low

Scored 0-4 where 4=most favorable nuclear materials security conditions

Scoring Method:

What is the level of risk to physical infrastructure as a result of climate impacts? 0 = Very high 1 = High 2 = Moderate 3 = Low 4 = Very low Note: To obtain the standardized scores, the sum of the physical risk factors as well as the adaptation capacity are scaled by a factor 0.725 so that the average score after adaptation capacity is equal to 1. Similarly, the weighted sum of the transition risk factors is multiplied by 2.520.

Source:

European Investment Bank

Rank 1/22 (tie)

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